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This dissertation presents my research analyzing the liquidity component of corporate 
bond spreads for bonds issued privately under Rule 144A during the period 2003 – 2011.  Rule 
144A bonds are limited to trading among qualified institutional investors and therefore are 
inherently less liquid than registered corporate bonds.  I assess an amendment to Rule 144 
modifying the restrictions on public resale of Rule 144A bonds intended to increase the liquidity 
of 144A bonds and decrease the cost of capital to firms issuing these securities.  This amendment 
provides an ideal exogenous shock to evaluate 144A bonds.  Assessing the liquidity premiums 
and yield spreads on the bonds before and after the amendment, I provide evidence of the 2008 
amendment’s impact on bond liquidity and cost of debt.  Specifically, I find that the liquidity 
premium for Rule 144A bonds has increased since the amendment and the yield spreads have 
increased accordingly.   This indicates the amendment did not have the desired regulatory impact 
of lowering the liquidity premium. 
I also assess a unique aspect of the 144A bond market.  Specifically, that certain 144A 
bonds are accompanied by registration rights agreements resulting in the 144A issue being 
exchanged for registered debt.  I analyze the impact of the 2008 amendment on registration rights 
finding that the probability of a bond having a registration rights agreement has decreased since 
the 2008 amendment.   
These new insights on 144A liquidity facilitate improved understanding of the yield 
premiums paid on 144A bonds and helps contribute to a distinct sector of the debt market by 
evaluating a market which is highly illiquid. 
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The most interesting markets to study liquidity are those in which 
liquidity is a problem, such as the real estate market, or the 
corporate bond market, where transactions are few and far 
between, for all but a small subset of the assets. 
 





Asset pricing theory suggests that an asset with more sensitivity to risk factors, such as 
default and liquidity, should offer investors higher returns for holding that asset.  Therefore, 
understanding the drivers behind pricing is essential in developing a cohesive asset pricing 
theory.  Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose that stock returns should be priced with a 
premium for exposure to market liquidity shocks.  The authors support their theory, finding the 
expected return of a stock is an increasing function of the sensitivity to market-wide liquidity 
shocks.  Confirming this, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) determine that the required rate of return 
of an asset is dependent on the expected liquidity and covariance of returns and liquidity between 
the asset and the market.   Furthermore, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest that it “would also 
be useful to explore whether some form of systematic liquidity risk is priced in other financial 
markets, such as fixed income markets…”   
My research evaluates liquidity in a subset of fixed income markets, specifically, the 
Rule 144A1 market.  The Rule 144A market allows the private placement of debt with certain 
institutions without registering the debt with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
Fixed income markets provide an opportune environment for evaluating the effects of liquidity 
on asset prices due to their known cash flows.  In addition, the bond market is less liquid2 than 
                                                 
1 17 CFR §230.144A, Private resales of securities to institutions 
2 Manhanti, et al., (2008) find in their comprehensive custodial sample of registered bonds from State Street 
Corporation that over 40% of the bonds do not even trade once a year. 
2 
the equity market and therefore, liquidity can be an important consideration for firms wishing to 
raise capital and potential bondholders looking to invest.  Bond liquidity has wide ranging 
financial impacts, including the price investors are willing to pay for a bond and the yield that the 
bond offers.  Therefore, the liquidity level of debt is a concern to issuers and investors, with 
investors requiring a premium on bonds with low liquidity.   
While liquidity is often thought of as the frequency of trading a security, a more 
comprehensive view of liquidity, especially in the bond market where bonds do not trade 
frequently, includes the costs and risks born by the investor.  Amihud et al. (2005) detail the 
sources of liquidity including exogenous transaction costs, demand pressure, inventory risk and 
the difficulty of locating a counter party.  When a security is traded, the transaction costs from 
the purchase and any anticipated future sale costs will be required to be reimbursed to the 
investor by way of a liquidity premium.  Demand pressure and inventory risk occur because the 
market may not always be able to match buyers and sellers, and therefore, market makers who 
purchase the securities require a liquidity premium for holding these securities in compensation 
for the risk of price changes.  (Amihud et al., 2005)  These sources of liquidity result in investors 
requiring a higher required return, which is the liquidity premium I am evaluating.   
Understanding liquidity is important to bond market participants, regulators and 
academics.  For firms issuing bonds, it is essential they know how bond prices are influenced by 
liquidity and other bond risk factors.  This can assist in the decision of issuing bonds: what type 
of bond to issue and in what market.  Understanding liquidity for an investor helps to determine 
the appropriate required return based on the liquidity risk of the investment.  Academics seek to 
comprehend the role liquidity plays in bond pricing to fully understand how bonds are priced and 
determine the cost of borrowing.   
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To identify the drivers behind bond pricing, such as liquidity, all markets must be 
included.  Until now, corporate bond liquidity studies have focused only on the registered bond 
market3.  My paper will be the first known paper to evaluate the liquidity premium associated 
with privately placed debt.   
The Rule 144A debt market has significant economic importance to firms raising capital 
and investors looking to participate in the market.   In 2010 alone, firms issued over $1 trillion 
dollars in registered and Rule 144A bonds with over half of that debt, $582 billion, issued 
through the 144A market.  This is almost three times the $201 billion raised by IPOs and 
secondary offerings in the same year.  It is clear that at over 50% of the debt market for 2010, the 
144A market is a viable and primary means for firms to raise capital.  Therefore, research on 
Rule 144A bonds can further the understanding of a market responsible for a significant source 
of capital and an economically significant avenue of investment.  Understanding the impact 
liquidity has on bond pricing is an important component in determining the costs of borrowing.   
The financial literature on liquidity and asset pricing is extensive and best summarized in 
a survey by Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005).  This survey reviews the theory behind 
liquidity and required returns and presents empirical relationships between liquidity and asset 
prices. Subsequent to this survey, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) evaluate the effects of 
liquidity on bond yields for both investment grade and high yield bonds.  Using investment grade 
and high-yield registered corporate bonds from the period 1995 – 2003, the authors find lower-
rated bonds are less liquid and there is a significant positive effect of liquidity on yield spreads.   
Recent bond liquidity research has focused on developing a single measure of liquidity.  
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) extract an aggregate liquidity measure using investment grade 
                                                 
3 Registered bond liquidity studies include: Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007), Bao 
Pan and Wang (2011). 
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bonds.  Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter and Lando (2011) measure liquidity using an equally weighted 
sum of four variables4 that measure liquidity and the systematic and unsystematic liquidity risk 
of a bond.  A problem using these types of liquidity measures across all bonds is they rely on 
transaction information which is not frequently available for lower grade bonds or bonds that are 
issued privately.  Bushman, Le, and Vasvari (2010) propose an implied liquidity measure that is 
computed by aggregating the liquidity preferences of the bond owners.  By assigning a liquidity 
value based on the bondholders’ preference to hold liquid or illiquid securities, this measure can 
be applied to bonds without transaction data; however, this method requires bondholder identity 
and holding information be available.   
Li, Shi and Wu (2006) and Chang and Hung (2010) overcome the lack of transaction 
information and bondholder data by implementing a liquidity measure derived from differencing 
the yield between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries as a proxy for corporate liquidity.  They 
argue that employing the liquidity of Treasuries as a proxy for corporate bond liquidity is 
appropriate because the liquidity from Treasuries influences the prices of other assets.  Chang 
and Hung (2010) use the findings of the strong cross-market liquidity correlation between 
Treasury and corporate bonds from Longstaff (2004) to affirm that liquidity has a cross-market 
effect and the spread of corporate bonds is proportional to the difference in yields between on- 
and off-the-run Treasuries. 
My research differs from other bond liquidity research in that it focuses directly on 
private debt issued under Rule 144A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (Securities Act).  
Rule 144A allows exemption to the registration requirements of the Securities Act for debt 
issued with specific types of institutional investors.  The restrictions imposed on bonds issued 
                                                 
4 Variables include: Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure estimating the price impact of trades; measure of round trip 
trading costs; variability of Amihud’s measure; variability of round trip trading costs  
5 
under Rule 144A make an ideal scenario for studying liquidity.  Measuring the liquidity of 144A 
bonds is difficult because the most common measures of liquidity require trading information 
that is not available in the evaluation of an asset such as 144A bonds.  Insight on 144A liquidity 
adds to the understanding of pricing securities by facilitating improved knowledge of the yield 
premiums paid on 144A bonds in addition to bond characteristics that impact liquidity.   
To determine the liquidity premium associated with the Rule 144A market I use a 
matched sample approach, matching by propensity score.5  By matching on specific bond 
characteristics, I am able to determine the liquidity premium on Rule 144A bonds above that 
paid on a similar registered bond.  I use ordinary least squares and firm fixed effects to determine 
the relationship between the liquidity premium and firm characteristics that proxy for liquidity.  
In addition, I evaluate the impact of an amendment to Rule 1446, the rule that allows public 
resale of Rule 144A bonds, to determine if the amendment lowered the liquidity premium.  I also 
evaluate the impact the amendment had on registration rights agreements. 
I find a statistically significant change in the liquidity premium priced into Rule 144A 
bonds after the SEC amended the rules governing the resale of these bonds.  While the stated 
objective of the amendment was to lower the liquidity premium and hence a firm’s cost of debt, 
my results find an increase in liquidity premium indicating that the regulation change did not 
serve its stated purpose of lowering the liquidity premium.   I also find a statistically significance 
difference between Rule 144A and registered bond yield spreads of approximately 2%.  The 
yield spread on the Rule 144A bonds is larger than registered bonds reflecting the higher default 
risk and lower liquidity characterized by the Rule 144A market.  In addition, I find the 
probability that a Rule 144A bond is issued with a registration rights agreement, requiring the 
                                                 
5 Other financial and accounting literature using a similar propensity score matching approach include: Campello et 
al. (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), McInnis and Collins (2011) 
6 17 CFR §230.144, Persons deemed not to be engaged in a distribution and therefore not underwriters 
6 
issuer to replace the Rule 144A debt with registered debt, has declined since the amendment 
indicating the reduced holding periods of the amendment decreased the need for investors to 
require a registration rights agreement.  
This research contributes to the literature on bond liquidity and extends the literature on 
the impact of Rule 144A debt offerings on bond yields by using liquidity to explain bond yields.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on 
liquidity in asset pricing and the Rule 144A debt market; Section 3 provides background on Rule 
144A and Rule 144; Section 4 contains a description of the methodology used for analysis of the 
data; Section 5 discusses the data and provides summary data statistics; Section 6 presents the 
regression analysis; and Section 7 concludes the paper.  All tables are provided in Appendix A of 
the Appendices and figures are provided in Appendix B.    
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CHAPTER 1: Asset Pricing, Liquidity and Rule 144A Review 
 
2. Review of Asset Pricing, Liquidity and Rule 144A Literature 
 
2.1 Liquidity and Asset Prices 
 
Early research on liquidity tests whether two assets with different liquidities have the 
same price.  This early literature [e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, 1986b), Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003)] focuses on equity prices.  The literature on liquidity of equity prices further 
expands to include the evaluation of liquidity on U.S. Treasuries [e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 
(1991), Kamara (1994), Longstaff (2004)].  Because default risk is not priced in U.S. Treasuries, 
liquidity can be easily determined and therefore, this literature evaluates if the difference in 
pricing for Treasuries of the same maturity is due to liquidity.  Subsequent to the research 
relating to the liquidity of Treasuries, the research expands to examine the liquidity priced into 
corporate bonds [Houweling, Mentick and Vorst (2005), Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007)].  I summarize this progression of liquidity research below.   
The effect of liquidity on asset prices is studied by Amihud and Mendelson (1986a).  
Using bid-ask spreads as a measure of liquidity, Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, 1986b) study 
the effects of liquidity on stock returns using varying types of investors with different expected 
holding periods.  In their basic model, a risk neutral investor will take into account transaction 
costs of selling when valuing a security.  The investor will account for all future streams of 
transaction costs in this valuation.  Based on this, the authors pose that the price discount due to 
illiquidity is the present value of the expected transaction costs over the life of the security.  As 
such, the required return on this security will be equal to the required return on a perfectly liquid 
identical security plus the expected trading cost per period.   
8 
Noting that the costs of the bid-ask spread have to be borne once over the holding period, 
the Amihud and Mendelson evaluate the holding period effect on the return-spread relationship.  
Investors with a preference for longer holding periods will be able to amortize the costs of the 
bid-ask spread over a longer period of time than those investors with a preference for short 
holding periods.  This longer holding period means investors that prefer longer holding periods 
pay a lower transaction cost per unit time.    Thus, investors with preference for shorter holding 
periods will be willing to pay a premium for securities with lower bid-ask spreads to lower their 
transaction costs per unit time.  Gross required return should then increase at a decreasing rate as 
the bid-ask spread increases.  If two securities that generated the same cash flow had the same 
return but different bid-ask spreads investors would prefer the security with the lower bid-ask 
spread.  As such, gross returns should increase as the bid-ask spread increases. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, 1986b) use monthly stock returns from the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1961 – 1980 to test the hypothesis that “expected stock return is 
an increasing and concave function of the spread.”  In other words, return increases at a 
decreasing rate.  Using a spread variable of the average of the beginning and end-of-year relative 
spreads7, the authors perform three main regressions.  The first tests the relationship of expected 
stock returns and beta using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  The second adds the 
spread variable as a determinate of expected return and the last regression tests the relationship 
of only the spread variable on expected returns.  Their results find a significant positive 
relationship between returns and beta using CAPM; however, when the spread variable is 
included, the spread value becomes highly significant for explaining expected returns while beta 
becomes a weak explanatory variable.  Using the spread variable only to estimate expected 
                                                 
7 relative spreads calculated as the dollar spread divided by the average of the bid and ask prices at the end of the 
year 
9 
returns, Amihud and Mendelson find a strong and significant positive relationship, confirming 
that higher spread stocks have higher excess returns.  They also find their slope coefficients of 
the spreads to be positive and generally decreasing confirming returns are increasing at a 
decreasing rate. 
While Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, 1986b) evaluate the relationship of expected 
returns to the level of liquidity, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) evaluate the relationship of 
expected returns to systematic liquidity risk to determine if liquidity is a state variable important 
in pricing stock.  In short, they investigate whether stocks with greater exposure to market 
liquidity shocks earn higher returns.  Their measure of liquidity depends on the principle that 
order flow results in lower liquid stocks having greater return reversal the next trading day. The 
measure of liquidity used for stock i in month t is obtained from the OLS estimate of γi,t in the 
regression: 
,, = 
, + φ,,, + ,,, υ,, + ,, 
Where: 
,, is the return on stock i on day d in month t 
,,  is the difference between ,, and the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
return on day d in month t 
υ,, is the dollar volume for stock I on day d in month t 
,,  is an indicator whose value is 1 if ,,  is positive and -1 if negative 
In this equation, order flow is proxied by the volume signed by the contemporaneous 
excess return on the stock.  If the market is not perfectly liquid the unbalanced order flow should 
be associated with a partially reversed return.  This means the liquidity measure, γ, should be 
negative and larger when equity liquidity is lower.  The authors find that this measure appears 
10 
important in stock prices.  Their findings show stocks that are more liquidity have higher returns 
and smaller stocks are less liquid and are more sensitive to liquidity.  
Transitioning the study of liquidity from equity to bonds, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) 
evaluate the effect of bond liquidity on yields using U.S. Treasury securities.  Specifically, the 
authors evaluate if liquidity has a similar impact on the pricing of bonds as it does on stocks and 
if so, does the effect relate to the bond’s time to maturity.  Because brokers provide liquidity in 
the U.S. Treasury market, buyers and sellers can trade instantaneously, reducing the need for 
individual investors to find compatible trading partners.  Therefore, the fees charged by the 
brokers are associated with the liquidity of the Treasury; specifically, lower fees, by way of 
lower bid-ask spreads, are associated with greater liquidity.    
In order to measure the liquidity of Treasuries Amihud and Mendelson select U.S. notes 
and bills with fewer than six months to maturity.  By the time notes approach maturity they are 
considered off-the-run, no longer trading, and are less liquid than bills.  On the other hand, the 
short-term maturities of bills make them highly liquid.  As stated previously, lower transaction 
costs reflect higher liquidity.  Comparing bills and notes permits the comparison of identical 
underlying cashflows, enabling the measuring of the Treasuries’ liquidity.  Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) therefore specifically test if these “bills, which have lower transaction costs, 
will have a lower yield to maturity than notes.” 
Employing data from the quote sheets of First Boston Corporation for 37 trading days 
between April and November 1987, Amihud and Mendelson compile data for bills and notes 
with fewer than six months to maturity.  Using the annualized yield to maturity relative to the ask 
price for each Treasury, they find that the typical bid-ask spread on notes, on the order of 1/32 of 
a point, is four times that of bills with a typical bid-ask spread of 1/128.  This reflects the lower 
11 
liquidity of Treasury notes.  They also find the yield to maturity on notes is higher than for a bill 
of equal maturity.  Both of these findings confirm that asset returns are a function of liquidity.  
Kamara (1994) follows up on Amihud and Mendelson’s (1991) finding by exploring the 
determinants leading to the differences in the yield to maturity of Treasury notes and bills.  Like 
Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Kamara also uses Treasury bills and notes with identical 
underlying cash flows.  To measure the liquidity risk of these Treasuries, Kamara uses 91 
observations of bid prices for Treasury bills and notes with fourteen weeks to maturity between 
the period of January 1977 to July 1984.  By regressing the difference in yields between notes 
and bills on proxies for liquidity, discount and premium variables and changes in dealers’ net 
positions of bills and notes, the author finds the note-bill differential reflects the difference in 
liquidity risk.  
Longstaff (2004) continues the study of the liquidity of Treasuries reviewed by Amihund 
and Mendelson (1991) and Kamara (1994) by testing the effect of liquidity on bond yields using 
bonds issued by the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp).  Refcorp is an agency 
established by Congress in 1989 to issue bailout bonds as a result of the savings and loan crisis 
of the 1980s.  These bonds are guaranteed by the U.S. government and, therefore, are default-
free and of the same credit risk as U.S. Treasuries.  Longstaff uses Bloomberg to collect month-
end yields for Treasury bonds and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds from April 1991 to March 2001.  
He finds a large liquidity premium priced into Treasury bonds.  The spread between the Refcor 
and Treasury bonds is statistically and economically significant.  Longstaff also tests if there is a 
flight-to-liquidity premium, when market participants prefer to hold securities with a higher 
liquidity, in Treasury bond prices.  By regressing the month end liquidity premium on measures 
of Treasury bond popularity that include consumer confidence index, change in the amount of 
12 
Treasury debt held by foreigners, percent change in the amount of funds held in money market 
mutual funds, the percent change in the amount of funds held in equity market funds and the 
change in the amount of Treasury securities available to investors, Longstaff finds a strong 
relationship between the liquidity premium and the aforementioned Treasury popularity variables 
used in the regression analysis.  
Houweling, Mentick and Vorst (2005) test the pricing of liquidity in the euro corporate 
bond market.  Using a liquidity portfolio based approach, the authors test whether their portfolios 
have significantly different yields.  They use the following variables to proxy for liquidity: 
issued amount, an equity listing indicator, a Euro bond denomination indicator, an on-the-run 
indicator, bond age, missing price indicator, yield volatility, the number of contributors, and 
yield dispersion.  The initial bond sample consists of bonds obtained from the Lehman Brothers 
Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond index.  Houweling, Mentick and Vorst collect bond 
characteristics from Bloomberg and Reuters 3000 Extra provides the daily bid yields for the 
period January 1999 to May 2001 for a total sample size of 1,190 bonds.  The authors find that 
all liquidity proxies are statistically significant for liquidity effects with the exception of the 
equity listing indicator.   
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) assess the credit default swap market for evidence of 
default risk or liquidity in corporate yield spreads.  Using the credit default premium the authors 
provide a direct measure of the size of the default and non-default components of the corporate 
yield spread.  Testing this measure on a case study of Enron, the authors use 5-year credit default 
swaps between December 5, 2000 and October 22, 2001.  While they find the default component 
of corporate debt accounts for a majority of the spread they also find evidence of a significant 
non-default component.  Regressing this non-default component on proxies for liquidity they 
13 
find a strong relationship with corporate bond liquidity.  Liquidity proxies in their analysis 
include: average bid-ask spread, amount outstanding, age of bond, time to maturity, financial 
firm indicator and high rated bond indicator.  They find that age of the bond is not statistically 
significant but all other proxies are significant.   
As follow-on to Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) suggesting bond liquidity as a 
possible explanation for yield spread variations, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) assess bond-
specific liquidity using corporate bonds from 1995 to 2003.  Their analysis employs the 
following liquidity measures: bid-ask spread, the LOT measure of liquidity8 and the percentage 
of zero returns9.  The authors find liquidity is priced into the corporate yield spreads of 
investment grade and high yield bonds.  Also using bond time to maturity, age, amount 
outstanding, bond volatility and bond rating to explain yield spreads, the authors find all of their 
liquidity measures are positively related to the yield spread.   
Recent literature on liquidity focuses more on developing new measures for liquidity than 
the previous literature that explained the yield spread with various liquidity proxies.  These new 
measures are mainly based on trade data, data that is not always available for less liquid bonds 
and is not publicly available for Rule 144A bonds.  Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) develop a 
measure of liquidity based on the autocovariance in relative price changes.  They use trade-by-
trade prices or end of day prices in order to develop their measure of liquidity.  This process 
requires that bonds must trade on at least 75% of all business days and at least ten price changes 
between the observed and lagged prices are required to develop the measure.  The authors 
acknowledge that the bonds in their sample are more frequently traded than typical bonds but 
argue that this bias supports their position on the importance of illiquidity in determining yield 
                                                 
8 Limited dependent variable model proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) 
9 The effect of liquidity observable through the incidence of zero returns, Bekaert et al. (2005). 
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spreads.  Using the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) data between April 2003 
and June 2009 they evaluate their liquidity measure on investment grade bonds and find it 
statistically and economically significant.  Their results find that, with a one standard deviation 
difference in bond liquidity, two equally rated bonds have a difference in yield spreads as large 
as 65 bps.  Their results find liquidity decreases with bond age, decreases with time to maturity, 
but increases with a bond’s issue amount.   
Bushman, Le and Vasvari (2010) recognize the issue with measuring liquidity when 
transaction data is unavailable and develop a measure of liquidity that is independent of pricing 
and trade data.  They base their measure of liquidity on the bondholders’ investment choices.  If 
an investor tends to hold more liquid securities, then they consider the bond to be more liquid.  
This method has the advantage of being applied without transaction data but only applies where 
bond holder data is available.  Using TRACE data for firms with publicly traded equity from 
January 2002 to December 2008, they compare their liquidity measure to three popular 
transaction based liquidity measures: Amihud (2002) measure, Roll (1984) measure and a price 
dispersion measure.  The authors find that their liquidity measure can significantly explain yield 
spreads and they are able to quantify a bond’s systematic liquidity risk using their measure.   
Dick-Nielson, Feldütter, and Lando (2011) also develop a new liquidity measure and 
analyze corporate bond spreads around the subprime crisis.  Their measure of liquidity is an 
equally weighted sum of four variables: Amihud’s measure of price impact, a measure of 
roundtrip cost of trading, and the variability of each of these two measures.  The authors regress 
the yield spread on measures of default and liquidity risk.  Specifically they control for default 
risk by the ratio of operating income to sales, ratio of long-term debt to assets, leverage ratio, 
equity volatility and pretax interest dummies.  To control for liquidity the authors include bond 
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age, amount issued, coupon rate and time-to-maturity.  Using investment grade and high-yield 
bonds from 2005 to 2009, they find a slow and persistent increase in liquidity for investment 
grade bonds with high-yield bonds exhibiting a stronger but a more short live increase in 
liquidity.  
 
2.2 Rule 144A Market 
 
Little has been written regarding the Rule 144A market since its inception in 1990.  Early 
research on the Rule 144A market is published by Fenn (2000).  Fenn focuses this research on 
the evaluation of high-yield straight debt issuances10.   Fenn evaluates the Rule 144A market 
from 1993 to 1998 and documents the shift of high-yield bonds from the registered market to the 
Rule 144A market and also notes that 97% of the high-yield bonds in his sample are 
subsequently registered with the SEC.11  Fenn’s research mainly assesses the information 
disclosure between registered bonds and Rule 144A issues.  He uses the bond yield spread as the 
dependent variable and proxies for inadequate disclosure with Rule 144A indicators, first time 
bond issuer indicators and privately owned indicators.  He also controls for rating, issue size, 
maturity, ranking of the bond as senior debt, the spread between Merrill Lynch 175 high yield 
index over Treasuries and includes a time trend.   Results of this study find that these premiums 
for inadequate disclosure have vanished over time and the author proposes that the investors do 
not value the information provided by registration of bonds.  He also proposes, but does not test, 
that the vanishing premiums indicate that investors do not regard Rule 144A issues as less liquid 
than their registered counterparts.  My research specifically evaluates this proposition by 
comparing the yield spreads between Rule 144A and registered bonds.   
                                                 
10 Fenn excludes foreign issuers and financial issuers stating they are only a small fraction of the high yield market.  
Foreign issuers account for over 36% of my Rule 144A sample and over half of my sample is high-yield debt. 
11 Registration typically occurs between 90 and 210 days 
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Livingston and Zhou (2002) continue the literature on Rule 144A bonds and evaluate the 
impact of Rule 144A debt on bond yields and underwriting fees by evaluating 1,418 non-
convertible, fixed coupon rate bonds issued between 1997 and 1999.  Their results differ from 
Fenn (2000) finding yield premiums are higher for debt issued under Rule 144A than for 
registered debt.  In reproducing Fenn’s results they explain this difference by concluding Fenn’s 
model is sensitive to time period and model specifications.  The authors find that high-yield 
bonds issued under Rule 144A have higher yield spreads than investment grade bonds and yield 
spreads for Rule 144A issued bonds are higher when the firm is a non-SEC reporting firm.  They 
pose the higher yield spreads could be due to liquidity differences, information asymmetry and 
weaker legal protection for investors.  My paper evaluates the liquidity difference priced into 
Rule 144A bonds.   
Registration rights are also evaluated by Livingston and Zhou who find that 
approximately 40% of the investment grade bonds issued in their 144A sample are accompanied 
with registration rights agreements and 98% of high-yield bonds have registration rights 
agreements.  Evaluating the yields for bonds with registration rights, the authors find that 
registration rights have a greater impact on the yields for high-yield bonds issued under Rule 
144A than for investment grade bonds issued under Rule 144A. 
Livingston and Zhou (2002) also evaluate underwriter fees on bonds issued under Rule 
144A and registered bonds.  They find no statistical difference between the fees on registered 
bonds and Rule 144A bonds but note that only 30% of their sample reports gross underwriter 
spread.  They explain the finding of no difference to the trade-off between it being harder to 
underwrite Rule 144A issues because of fewer potential investors and information asymmetry 
but that Rule 144A issues may be less risky and involve less work.  These two effects offset each 
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other, resulting in a finding of no difference in underwriter fees between Rule 144A and 
registered bonds. 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) continue the research in the Rule 144A market by 
specifically evaluating the yield spreads for international firms placing debt privately.  They 
assess fixed rate debt issued by international firms between 1991 and 1997 and limit their 
sample12 to industrial issues of long-term13, fixed rate debt.  Their findings show that investment 
grade Rule 144A foreign bonds have higher yield spreads than foreign investment grade 
registered bonds, but high-yield Rule 144A issues have yield spreads comparable to high-yield 
registered bonds.  The authors suggest this reveals a bifurcation of the market where high-quality 
firms issue in both the registered and Rule 144A markets but face higher spreads in the Rule 
144A market and lower quality firms issue debt only in the Rule 144A market.  They also find 
that 144A debt issued by foreign firms is smaller in size, shorter in maturity and has lower credit 
ratings than registered debt issued by foreign firms.  Of these firms, they find that they typically 
do not have equity listed in their home country or in the United States. 
Huang and Ramirez (2010) evaluate convertible and straight debt issued in the registered 
bond market, Rule 144A bond market and bank loan market from 1991 to 2004 assessing the 
issuer’s choice of issuance and include shelf and non-shelf registered debt along with the Rule 
144A and bank loan markets.  They obtain their debt offerings from Thompson SDC and only 
evaluate non-financial firms14.  Their initial sample includes 855 Rule 144A convertible 
issuances, reducing this further to 554 after screening their data.  The sample is larger for straight 
debt issues with an initial sample size of 2,245 which reduces to 1,414 issues.  Using a nested 
                                                 
12 This sample consists of 195 bonds issued by international firms in the Rule 144A market and 170 registered bonds 
issued by international firms. 
13  maturity > 2 years 
14 Financial firms represent 36.68% of my fixed coupon Rule 144A bonds and 75.87% of my fixed coupon 
registered bonds. 
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logit regression, the authors evaluate the choice between convertible and straight debt issues.  
Specific to the Rule 144A market they find an increase in both straight and convertible debt but 
this migration is from the non-shelf registered market and not from the shelf or bank market.  
Huang and Ramirez also document the subsequent registration of bonds issued under 
Rule 144A.  Similar to Fenn (2000) and Livingston and Zhou (2002), they find a large 
percentage of their sample subsequently registers the debt with the SEC.  Specifically, 88% of 
convertible and 91% of straight debt issued in the Rule 144A market are registered with the SEC.  
Assessing the time period to register, over 80% of the bonds issued in the Rule 144A have a 




CHAPTER 2: Rule 144A and Registered Bond Markets 
 
3. Background on Rule 144A 
 
The Securities Act requires that all securities be registered unless specifically exempted.  
Rule 144A of the Securities Act, adopted in 1990, provides just this exemption, allowing debt to 
be issued privately without firms having to register with the SEC.  The SEC had two reasons for 
adopting Rule 144A: the first, increasing liquidity of the private placement market, and the 
second, making the private placement market more attractive to foreign firms looking to raise 
capital (Carey et al., 1993).   
Rule 144A restricts the sale of securities to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) who are 
generally defined under Rule 144A as firms that own and invest, on a discretionary basis, at least 
$100 million in securities.  QIBs are further defined as banks and savings and loans with a net 
worth of at least $25 million and broker-dealers with a net worth of at least $10 million dollars.  
QIBs are not considered part of the public and can resell private placements issued under Rule 
144A amongst other QIBs without violating the registration requirements of the Securities Act. 
Placements under Rule 144A are subsequently regulated under Rule 144 for public 
resale.  Prior to 2008, QIBs were required to hold securities issued under Rule 144A for a period 
of one to two years before public resale, depending on whether the issuing firm was a reporting 
or non-reporting issuer to the SEC.  If a reporting issuer, the placement had to be held by the 
QIBs for a minimum of one year prior to trading with the public.  For non-reporting issuers, the 
holding period was set at two years.  After the holding period had elapsed, other restrictions, 
such as public information requirements and trading volume limitations, applied.   
In 2008, the SEC amended Rule 144 in order to “increase the liquidity of privately sold 
securities and decrease the cost of capital for all issuers without compromising investor 
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protection.” (SEC 2007)  This amendment reduced by half the holding periods for reporting and 
non-reporting issuers from one and two years to six months and one year, respectively.  In 
addition, for QIBs that are non-affiliates of the issuer, the volume restrictions for resale are 
removed.  As a result, after the 2008 amendment, a QIB not affiliated with the issuer could 
publicly trade any volume of a security acquired under Rule 144A after a six month holding 
period subject only to the restriction that the issuer maintain adequate current public information.  
My research evaluates the impact this amendment has on the Rule 144A market by assessing the 
liquidity and the issuing yield spread of Rule 144A bonds before and after the 2008 amendment 
to determine if the amendment achieved its stated goals of increasing the liquidity and lowering 
the cost of debt to the issuing firm.  
An interesting effect of the Rule 144 holding restrictions is the creation of registration 
rights agreements that accompany select debt issued under Rule 144A.  These agreements 
specify that the 144A issue will be replaced by registered debt identical in par, coupon and time 
to maturity within a certain time period, typically less than a year.  This replacement is called an 
A/B Exchange or Exxon Capital exchange named after the SEC no-action letter permitting the 
practice.  My research evaluates if registration rights influence the liquidity of a bond issued 
under Rule 144A and if the 2008 amendment to Rule 144 impacted the probability a bond would 




Liquidity is a difficult concept to quantify.  Specific to Rule 144A bonds, information 
relating to the QIB holders and trades is not available and therefore, I rely on proxies that reflect 
different aspects of liquidity that have been used in past literature. 
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My first proxy for the liquidity of Rule 144A bonds employs the difference in the yields 
between on-the-run Treasuries and the average yield for off-the-run Treasuries, similar to Li, Shi 
and Wu (2006) and Chang and Hung (2010).  Utilizing monthly Treasury pricing data, Treasury 
bonds are sorted into on-the-run and off-the-run bonds for each month in the sample period in 
order to match to the issue date of the Rule 144A bonds.15  On-the-run bonds are those bonds 
that have been most recently issued relative to the month.  Chang and Hung (2010) apply this 
measure of liquidity spread in the Treasury bond market and find it as a suitable proxy for the 
liquidity component of corporate bonds.  Therefore, I expect to see a positive effect of the 
Treasury proxy on liquidity premium. 
In addition to the difference in on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury yields as a proxy for 
liquidity, my analysis uses the issue size of the bond.  Fisher (1959) proposed large issues should 
trade more frequently and therefore, issue amount proxies for the direct liquidity measure of 
trading volume.  This is in line with Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, 1986b, 1991) who argue 
that bonds with smaller issue amounts get locked into buy-and-hold portfolios and hence trade 
less and, in turn, are less liquid.  This proxy has been found in past literature16 to be negative and 
statistically significant supporting the theory that smaller issues are less liquid.  Therefore, I 
anticipate a negative impact of amount issued on liquidity premium. 
In concert with Amihud and Mendelson’s buy-and-hold portfolio theory, bonds with 
shorter maturities are less likely to be locked into portfolios and will therefore be more liquid 
than longer maturity bonds.   Consequently, my evaluation uses the time to maturity for the 
                                                 
15 I difference on-the-run and off-the-run bonds for one-period off-the-run and two-period off-the-run bonds.  This 
means for one-period off-the-run, I take the difference between the on-the-run bond and the bond that was issued the 
prior period.  For two-period off-the-run I difference the on-the-run bond with the bond that was issued two periods 
prior. 
16 Houweling et al. (2005), Alexander et al. (2000), Hong and Warga (2000), Jankowitsch et al. (2006), 
Krishnamurthy (2002) and Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000) 
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bonds as a proxy for liquidity.  Longstaff et al. (2005) use maturity as a proxy for liquidity 
arguing that there may be maturity clienteles for corporate bonds and therefore shorter maturity 
bonds should be more liquid.  They find a strong positive relation between the non-default 
component and the time to maturity of a bond supporting the theory that shorter-maturity bond 
are more liquid than longer-maturity bonds.  As such, I expect the liquidity premium to be lower 
for longer maturities.  
Longstaff et al. (2005) proxy for liquidity using an indicator variable for whether or not 
the issuing firm is a financial institution and another indicator variable if the issuing firm is 
highly rated (credit rating AAA or AA).  They argue that financial firms are more connected to 
capital markets and, as a result, financial firms should have bonds more liquid than bonds from 
other firms.  They find the financial indicatory significant and positive in sign which is counter 
to their argument that financial firms enjoy bonds with higher liquidity but it confirms industry 
effects are accounted for in the liquidity of a bond.  The relationship of the financial indicator 
with liquidity could be positive as supported by Longstaff et al.’s empirical results or negative in 
support of Longstaff’s theory due to differences in the Rule 144A and registered bond markets.   
Longstaff et al.’s intuition behind using an indicator for the credit rating is that there is a 
“flight-to-quality” or “flight-to-liquidity” associated with higher rated bonds because they are 
more marketable and as a result, their liquidity should be higher.  Longstaff et al. (2005) find the 
coefficient on the rating indicator variable significant and negative supporting the “flight-to-
liquidity” premium in corporate bonds.  I utilize an indicator variable for each rating category.  
For example, BBB+, BBB and BBB- would all be in the same category and have an indicator of 
1 if the bond was rated any of these three ratings categories or 0 if it was rated in another 
category.  I also utilize an indicator variable for highly rated bond and an indicator variable for 
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registration rights to capture the liquidity associated with bonds having registration rights 
agreements. 
As the dataset contains both domestic and foreign firms that place debt in the Rule 144A 
market, an indicator noting the country of incorporation as being U.S. or non-U.S. proxies as a 
liquidity measure.  The intuition behind this proxy is that due to the differences in securities laws 
and corporate environments, bonds from foreign firms may be less desirable and U.S. bonds 
would exhibit a “flight-to-quality” over some foreign issued debt.  In this case, there will be a 
negative relationship between the U.S. indicator and the liquidity premium. 
An indicator for senior debt and a separate indicator for subordinate debt, signifying 
whether or not the security rank is senior or subordinate, are applied as liquidity proxies.  A 
senior security is a security that has a claim prior to junior obligations and equity on a 
corporation’s assets in the event of liquidation.  A subordinate security has lowest rank for 
repayment.  The intuition behind this indicator is that there may be a “flight-to-quality” 
component associated with senior ranked bonds, specifically for those bonds issued by firms in 
financial distress.  If this theory holds, I would expect to see a negative relationship between 
senior payment rank and liquidity premium and a positive relationship between subordinate 
payment rank and liquidity premium.  However, an argument can be made that senior payment 
rank bonds are more likely to be locked into buy-and-hold portfolios and hence trade less and, in 
this case, there would be a positive relationship between senior payment rank and liquidity 
premium.  This theory would translate to a negative relationship between subordinate payment 
rank and liquidity premium.   
Lastly, I employ an indicator specifying whether the issuing firm is listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange at the time of the issue or if the issuer has a parent company with stock listed on a U.S. 
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exchange.   Alexander et al. (2000) finds that bond issues of private firms trade more often than 
issues of public firms reflecting the higher liquidity of private firm bonds.  They explain this 
result based on the fact that the only investment vehicle for a private company is debt while 
public firms have both debt and equity traded and hence, private firm debt will trade more often 
and have a higher liquidity.  Therefore, I anticipate the liquidity premium to be higher for public 
firms. 
I calculate the bond yields at the time of issue for 144A bonds from the information 
provided by Bloomberg.  Benchmark Treasuries for calculating yield spreads are obtained from 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  Cubic spline interpolation is used on the Treasury yield 
curve to interpolate Treasury yields for each 144A bond maturity, then this interpolated value is 
matched to each bond by day of issue.  The interpolated Treasury yield is differenced from the 
bond yield to obtain the yield spread.  The same process is used for the registered bond data, 
interpolating the Treasury yield curve to the maturities of each registered bond. 
Treasury bond price data is obtained from CRSP.  I sort Treasury bonds into on-the-run 
and off-the-run for each month in the sample period in order to match to the issue date of the 
Rule 144A bonds.  
For those bonds issued with registration rights agreements, I collect data from Bloomberg 
on the length of time between issuance of the 144A debt and the A/B exchange.  I use TRACE to 
collect the initial price of the exchanged bond when it first trades to calculate a yield for the 
exchanged bonds.  From this, the liquidity spread is calculated between the 144A issue and the 
A/B exchange.  To verify the default risk has not changed between the issue date of the 144A 
bond and the exchange, I also collect Moody’s and S&P ratings on the exchanged bonds to 
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ensure they are the same as for the 144A issue.  This liquidity spread represents the liquidity 
premium that is being paid on the unregistered debt.  
 
4.1 Matched Control Sample Approach 
 
The measurement of liquidity may be performed directly by comparing two assets that 
are identical except for their liquidity.  I compare 144A issues to their registered counterparts to 
develop a dependent variable for regression analysis.  The idea behind matching is to select a 
registered bond that resembles the Rule 144A bond such that the difference in the yield spreads 
of the matched group provides the liquidity premium associated with the Rule 144A market. 
Specifically, for each bond issued under Rule 144A, I match by propensity score to the 
nearest registered bond.17  The benefit of using the propensity score is that it matches the Rule 
144A bonds and registered bonds based on a large number of bond characteristics.  This 
matching produces the best match given the observable bond characteristics. 
Using the 144A bonds as the treatment and the registered bonds as the untreated 
component in the matching, the propensity score for each bond is determined based on the 
following bond characteristics: yield spread, amount issued, the bond rating, the industry, 
whether the bond is senior payment rank, whether the firm issuing the bond has equity traded on 
a U.S. exchange, and the issue year.  The nearest neighbor matching estimator is used, allowing 
replacement, which means a registered bond can be matched more than once to the Rule 144A 
bond sample.  By allowing replacement I obtain a higher quality of matching. 
Once the bonds are matched, I difference the yield spread of the Rule 144A bond and the 
yield spread of the registered bond to derive the liquidity premium associated with Rule 144A 
bonds used in the analysis.   
                                                 
17 STATA ado psmatch2 is used to calculate propensity scores. 
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4.2 Exchanged Bond Approach 
 
Bonds issued with registration rights agreements provide a unique situation for 
developing a dependent variable.  Within a relatively short time period (on average six months), 
a majority of bonds issued with registration rights agreements are exchanged for registered debt 
that is then free to trade on the secondary market.  By using the trade price of the registered debt, 
a yield can be calculated for the exchanged bond.  Since these registered bonds are issued for the 
same firm, the difference between the yields for debt issued privately under Rule 144A and the 
yields of the subsequently registered debt provides a liquidity spread attributable to the Rule 
144A market.  I use this liquidity spread as a dependent variable to evaluate the liquidity of the 
Rule 144A market and determine the impact to the liquidity as a result of the 2008 amendment. 
In order to ensure the default risk for the bonds is still the same between the Rule 144A 
issue and the exchanged registered debt, I compare Moody’s and S&P ratings between the two 
issues to verify the resulting difference between yields truly reflects liquidity and not a change in 




To evaluate the liquidity premium of Rule 144A bonds I use cross-sectional ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression.  I also perform a firm fixed effects (FE) regression to control for 
any firm impact on liquidity premium as there are multiple firms in my dataset that issue more 
than one bond in the Rule 144A market.  Using liquidity premium as the dependent variable, the 
regression equation is given as: 
 =  +  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Where lp is the liquidity premium.  The regression is analyzed using multiple liquidity 
proxies, where proxy includes:  
• The time until the bond matures in years at issuance 
• The coupon rate of the bond 
• The issue size in total dollars of the bond 
• An indicator for callable bonds 
• A ratings indicator for S&P ratings categories 
• A rating indicator for Moody’s ratings categories 
• The difference between S&P and Moody’s rating indicators   
• An indicator for senior payment rank 
• An indicator for subordinate payment rank 
• The two period spread between the yields of off- and on-the-run Treasuries  
• An indicator if the issuing firm is a financial firm 
• An indicator for bonds issued after the Rule 144 amendment 
• An indicator if the firm has equity traded on a U.S. exchange 
The OLS regression analysis also controls for industry effects using indicator variables 
for the following industries: basic materials; communications; consumer – cyclical, consumer – 
non-cyclical; diversified, energy; financial; industrial; technology and utilities. 
I also evaluate the yield spread of Rule 144A and registered bonds using cross-sectional 
OLS and firm fixed effects regression.  Using yield spread as the dependent variable, calculated 
by differencing the bond’s yield to maturity with an interpolated Treasury yield, the regression 
equation is given as:   
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Where proxy includes those variables listed above for the liquidity premium analysis and 
the industry indicators for the OLS analysis.  I analyze the difference between yield spreads of 
Rule 144A and registered bonds.  In addition, I evaluate the impact of the Rule 144 2008 
amendment to determine if the cost of debt has decreased.  From this regression, I can determine 
if there are differences in yields between registered debt and Rule 144A debt and if the cost of 
debt has declined for issuing firms as a result of the 2008 Rule 144A amendment.   
Lastly, I test the impact of the Rule 2008 amendment on registration rights agreements 
with the following regression: 
Pr%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Where proxies include those variables listed for the liquidity premium analysis including 
the industry indicators specified above.   
 
5. Data and Statistics 
 
I collect the bond information on both Rule 144A issues and registered issues from 
Bloomberg Professional for the period January 1, 2003 – December 31, 2011.  This database 
includes both domestic and foreign issued debt in addition to debt issued by public and private 
firms.  Bond characteristics from Bloomberg include: issued amount, issued date, time to 
maturity, senior debt, Moody’s rating, S&P rating, exchange listing, country of incorporation and 
details on exchanged bonds.   
My initial sample contains 21,850 Rule 144A and 45,825 registered bonds.  From both 
bond sets I delete bonds with the amount issued, minimum piece, par amount and issue price 
29 
equal to one.  Bloomberg has stated that bond information that is provided to them prior to 
issuance without final values established for these parameters is set at one and therefore, deleting 
these occurrences removes data with missing information.  In addition, pay-in-kind bonds, flat 
trading bonds and bonds with prices set by auction are deleted.  Bonds with missing prices, issue 
dates and maturity dates are also deleted.  These deletions result in a final count of 17,264 144A 
bonds and 35,247 registered bonds. 
 
5.1 Full Sample Summary Statistics 
 
I present a comparison summary between the Rule 144A bonds and the registered bonds 
in Table 1 for the full sample of bonds of all coupon types.  Table 1 indicates that the Rule 144A 
market has significant economic significance for firms raising capital.  Over the 2003-2011 time 
period over $4.65 trillion was issued in the Rule 144A market.   Comparing this to the $4.67 
trillion issued in the registered debt market, it is clear that the Rule 144A bond market is a major 
source of capital.  In fact, until the 2008 financial crisis the Rule 144A market raised more 
capital than the registered bond market (see Table 1).  However, the Rule 144A market raised 
fewer funds than the registered bond market during the 2008 and 2009 years with $338.64 and 
$404.77 billion for those years in the Rule 144A market compared to $592.24 and $605.34 
billion issued in registered bonds.  The Rule 144A market seemed to regain its lead again issuing 
$582.39 billion, passing the total dollar value of funds raised by registered bonds in 2010 at 
$459.52 billion.   
While the total dollar value of bonds issued in the Rule 144A market is, for the most part, 
greater than that raised by registered bonds in my sample, there are fewer bonds issued in the 
Rule 144A market than the registered bond market.  This means that, on average, the issue 
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amount is greater for Rule 144A bonds than for registered bonds and is evident from the number 
of bonds issued and the average bond issue amount in Table 1. 
Table 1 also identifies the percent of callable bonds in the sample, senior debt or 
subordinate debt for Rule 144A and registered bonds.  Prior to the financial crisis, in 2003 and 
2004, the amount of callable bonds is similar between the Rule 144A and registered bond 
markets.  With the onset of the financial crisis, the number of callable bonds decreased for both 
markets with a much larger decrease for registered bonds.  This may reflect investors’ demand to 
lock in investments during an unstable economy.  Starting with 2009, the Rule 144A market has 
a much higher rate of callable bonds than the registered market.  The registered bond market has 
been mostly comprised of senior debt with very little subordinate debt, while the rule 144A has 
increasingly been replaced by senior debt over time with a decrease in subordinate date.  This 
change makes the Rule 144A market closer to the senior and subordinate status of the registered 
bond market by 2011.  
I further provide data summaries for the Rule 144A bond market in Table 2.  It is 
apparent from Table 1 and Table 2 that the structure of the Rule 144A bond market has changed 
over time.  In 2003, U.S. firms issued 83.61% of the total number of bonds in the Rule 144A 
market.  This value has steadily declined to U.S firms issuing only 44.77% of the total number of 
bonds by 2011 as shown in Table 2.  The total dollar amount of funds raised by U.S. firms in the 
Rule 144A bond market has also declined.  This has been replaced with an increase in the 
number of bonds and the total amount issued by foreign firms.   
The change in the structure of the Rule 144A bond market is also apparent when 
examining the time to maturity at issue.  Table 2 shows that while the average years to maturity 
has remained relatively constant at around seven years, the percentage of bonds issued each year 
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with maturities greater than fifteen years has declined from 14.47% in 2003 to only 5.84% in 
2011.  There has also been a decline in the number of short term bonds, with maturities less than 
two years.  Bonds with a time to maturity at issue of between two to seven years and between 
seven and fifteen years have seen an increase from 23.13% and 26.85% in 2003 to 39.55% and 
39.11% in 2011, respectively.  
Table 2 also summarizes the registration rights agreements of the Rule 144A bonds.  The 
percent of bonds issued with registration rights agreements increased after 2008 but values never 
exceed 30% of the bonds issued, significantly below the 97% of high-yield Rule 144A bonds 
subsequently registered documented by Fenn (2000). Livingston and Zhou (2002) also find 
significantly more bonds with registration rights than shown in Table 2 for my sample.  They 
find approximately 40% of investment grade bonds and 98% of high-yield bonds are 
accompanied with registration rights agreements.  As Fenn evaluates only high-yield and 
Livingston and Zhou break their sample down by debt rating, I further divide registration rights 
by S&P ratings and determine the percentage of investment grade, high-yield and not rated debt 
with registration rights that are ultimately exchanged.  Consistent with Livingston and Zhou 
(2002), high-yield bonds have a significantly higher percentage of bonds with registration rights 
agreements than investments grade bonds.  Over the sample time period, the high-yield debt is 
exchanged at a higher percentage than the investment grade debt, perhaps reflecting the high-
yield debt firms’ inability to afford the penalty fees for not exchanging the debt within the 
registration rights agreement timeframe.  This still does not reflect the 97% of high-yield debt 
that is subsequently registered as reported by Fenn (2000).  My highest percentage of high-yield 
bonds with registration rights that are subsequently registered occurs in 2004 with 67.61% of the 
bonds with registration rights agreements subsequently registered.  This difference in value could 
32 
reflect a change in the structure of the Rule 144A market over time as Fenn is using data from 
1993 – 1998 or could reflect Fenn excluding foreign and financial issues. 
The differences in coupon types between the Rule 144A and registered bond market are 
summarized in Table 3.  From this table, it can be seen that the Rule 144A market is issuing 
fewer floating rate bonds and more fixed rate bonds over time.  In contrast, the registered bond 
market is issuing fewer fixed rate and floating rate bonds and more zero coupon and variable rate 
bonds.  
Increasing foreign investment in the United States is one reason provided by the SEC for 
initially issuing Rule 144A.  Therefore, I compare the issuer home countries for bonds issued in 
both markets.  A summary of these values is presented in Table 4.  Over the entire sample, the 
proportion of issuers from the United States is relatively the same between the Rule 144A market 
and the registered bond market, with U.S. firms issuing 71.47% of the bonds in the Rule 144A 
market and 71.04% of the bonds in the registered bond market.  The main difference between the 
composition of countries issuing in the two markets is that approximately 99% of the issuances 
in the registered bond market are from eight countries including the United States.  In contrast, 
approximately 94% of the issuances in the Rule 144A market are from thirteen countries.  There 
are thirty-three countries comprising the 99% of issuance found by only eight countries in the 
registered bond market.   
Evaluating the data distribution by year, both the Rule 144A bond and the registered 
bond markets have experienced a decline in the percentage of issuers whose home country is the 
United States.  The Rule 144A market exhibits a steadier decline of U.S. firms reflecting a 
noticeable impact from the financial crisis with a significant drop of U.S. firm participation from 
72.33% in 2008 to 56.16% in 2009.  The registered bond market has a steeper decline starting 
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97% of the firms from the U.S. in 2003 to approximately 56% by 2011.  The registered bond 
market displays an increase from 59% in 2008 to 77% in 2009 only to be followed by a 
subsequent fall to 41% in 2010.  
Differences in the Rule 144A and registered bond markets are also apparent when 
reviewing bond ratings.  Table 5 provides the percentage of investment grade and high-yield 
bonds rated by Moody’s and S&P.  Panel A contains the Moody’s ratings and Panel B contains 
the S&P ratings.  For bonds rated by Moody’s, investment grade bonds are those bonds rated Baa 
or higher and high-yield bonds are rated less than Baa.  Investment grade bonds rated by S&P are 
BBB- and higher.  Also included in the table is the percent of bonds that are not rated by 
Moody’s and S&P.  As seen in Table 5, the registered bond market has a higher percentage of 
investment grade bonds but has shown a steady decline since 2003.  There is also a substantial 
increase in the percentage of registered bonds that are not rated by Moody’s across the sample 
period.  The Rule 144A market saw a small uptick in investment grade bonds in 2005 and 2006 
with a significant drop in 2008.  High yield bonds showed a decrease in the 2006 – 2008 time 
period but this turned around in 2009.  For 2009 – 2011 the percentage of investment grade and 
high-yield bonds in my sample are similar.  Approximately a third of the bonds over the time 
period are not rated by Moody’s.  This value saw a dramatic increase to 63% in 2008 but reverts 
to approximately a third with the 2009 period.  The S&P ratings follow a similar trend for 
registered bonds with a substantial decline in investment grade bonds and an increase in bonds 
that are not rated by S&P.  The Rule 144A market also shows a comparable trend for S&P 
ratings as with Moody’s ratings.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide a breakdown of participation in the markets by industry.  
As seen in these figures, both markets are dominated by the financial industry issuing bonds.  
34 
The registered bond market has 85.91% of the participants from the financial sector while the 
Rule 144A has only 68.06%.  Further breaking down the participation by the financial sector, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide the subsectors of the financial industry for the Rule 144A and 
registered bond markets, respectively.  The financial sector participates in the Rule 144A market 
is primarily comprised of diversified financial services with 60.06% of the subsector, followed 
by banks comprising 28.08% of the subsector.  In contrast, banks comprise a majority of the 
registered bond subsector with 53.60% followed by diversified financial services at 34.92%. 
 
5.2 Fixed Coupon Bond Summary Statistics 
 
The full data sample has been limited to fixed coupon, non-convertible, bonds.  These 
deletions result in 6,465 of fixed coupon bonds in the final sample.  The same filter was applied 
to the registered bond sample resulting in a final bond count of 15,289 registered bonds.  A total 
of 2,978 firms issued the 6,465 bonds in the Rule 144A market.  Of this, 1,745 firms issued only 
one bond.  The registered bond market shows a marked difference in the number of firms issuing 
the 15,289 bonds in the sample.  Only 1,200 individual firms issued the registered bonds with 
503 of these firms issuing only one bond.  It is clear that the registered bond market has more 
repeat issuers than the Rule 144A market. 
Table 6 provides the Rule 144A bond and registered bond summary statistics for the 
fixed coupon rate bonds.  This table can be compared with Table 1 to identify differences from 
the full sample of all coupon type bonds to the final sample of fixed coupon bonds.  Differences 
found in comparing the two tables include the increase in the average amount issued in the Rule 
144A market over all time periods.  The registered bond market fixed coupon bonds have a 
lower average amount issued than the full sample up until 2007 when there is an increase that is 
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sustained through 2011.  The Rule 144A fixed bond sample also has a higher percentage of 
callable and senior payment rank bonds than the full sample.  The range for callable Rule 144A 
bonds has increased from 30%-60% for the full sample to 53%-78% for the fixed coupon 
sample.  The senior payment rank shows the most change from 2003 – 2009 increasing from a 
range of 30% - 78% to 50% - 87%.  While 2003 and 2004 show no measurable change for 
registered bonds, the follow-on years also show an increase in callable registered bonds from 
17% - 45% to 51% - 65% .  The senior payment rank for registered bonds does not show as 
much of an increase between the fixed coupon sample and the full sample as the Rule 144A bond 
but there is an increase between 1% - 13% per year except for 2008 which saw a 5% decline in 
the amount of bonds in the sample that had senior payment rank status.  The subordinate 
payment rank for both Rule 144A and registered bonds shows a slight increase for the fixed 
coupon bond sample over the full sample. 
Data statistics specific to the fixed coupon bond Rule 144A bond sample are presented in 
Table 7.  Comparing Table 2 and Table 7 provides insight into the differences between the fixed 
bond sample and the full sample.  The total percentage of bonds issued by U.S. and non-U.S. 
firms has stayed relatively constant but the issue size has seen a noticeable drop for both U.S. 
firms and non-U.S. firms.  The largest difference in the two samples for U.S. firms is in the early 
years with around $200 million difference in the average bond issue amount.  However, 2009 
through 2011 reflected only a small, less than $31 million, difference between the two samples.  
The non-U.S. firms have around a $60 million difference per year, except for 2005 through 2008, 
with a much higher difference between the full bond sample and the fixed coupon bond sample, 
between $115 and $222 million.  The average time to maturity also exhibits a slight increase in 
the fixed coupon bond sample with the greatest difference occurring in 2006 with a 3.49 year 
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difference in the averages.  Limited the sample to only fixed coupon bonds has an increase on the 
percentage of bonds with registration rights agreements and the number of bonds with 
agreements that are actually exchanged.   
One reason given by the SEC for issuing Rule 144A was to increase foreign investment 
in the United States.  Therefore, I compare the final fixed coupon bond sample with the full 
sample.  Table 8 provides the breakdown by issuer home country for the bonds issued in the 
fixed coupon rate sample.  In comparison to Table 4, the proportion of total issuances by U.S. 
firms stayed relatively the same for the Rule 144A bond market; however, there was a substantial 
increase in U.S. firms issuing bonds in the registered bond market increasing from 70.98% to 
94.05%. 
Table 9 presents the Moody’s and S&P ratings for the fixed coupon bond sample.  
Comparing Table 9 with Table 5, for both ratings the total number of bonds without ratings has 
decreased from the full sample.  This change is mainly reflected in an increase in high-yield 
bonds with ratings in the Rule 144A market and an increase in investment grade bonds with 
ratings in the registered bond market. 
Lastly, comparing industry sectors, between the full sample and the fixed coupon sample, 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show a clear change in industries from the full sample.  By comparing 
with Figure 1 and Figure 2 it is obvious there is a substantial decrease in the number of financial 
firms issuing fixed coupon bonds in the Rule 144A sample.  Financial firms comprised of 
68.03% of the firms for the full sample compared to only 36.38% in the fixed income bond 
sample.  The registered bond sample showed a less dramatic decline in financial firms issuing 




5.2.1 Fixed Coupon Bond Sample Correlations 
 
Table 10 provides the pairwise correlations for the Rule 144A variables.  Most pairwise 
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.  As expected, the correlation between 
coupon rate and yield spread and the correlation between liquidity premium and yield spread is 
strong and positive.  In addition, the pairwise correlation coefficients for registered bonds are 
presented in Table 11.  Again I find that most correlations are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.   
 
5.2.2 Fixed Coupon Bond Means 
 
Table 12 contains a summary of the variable means separated into Rule 144A and 
registered bonds.  The first set of means provides the variable averages over the entire sample 
period.  The second and third set of means provide the variable averages before and after the 
amendment to Rule 144A to determine if the variables exhibit a significant difference before and 
after the amendment.   
It is clear from Table 12 that the market has undergone a significant change before and 
after the amendment.  These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for all 
variables in the registered bond market and all except for time-to-maturity and Moody’s rating in 
the Rule 144A market.  In particular, I observe a significant increase in the average liquidity 
premium of Rule 144A bonds after the Rule 144 amendment.  Before the amendment, the 
liquidity premium averaged -79 bps which increased markedly to 1.39% after the amendment.  
This  
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Examining the first two columns of Table 12, the spread for the Rule 144A sample is 
approximately 2% higher than registered bonds at 3.58% and 1.52%, respectively.  Summing the 
registered bonds’ average spread of 1.52% with the average Rule 144A liquidity premium of 87 
bps, an average spread of 2.40% would be the expected spread for Rule 144A bonds.  This is 
lower than the average 3.58% spread reflected by the data most likely reflecting the additional 
default risk priced into the yield spreads of Rule 144A bonds over that of registered bonds.   
This difference in default risk between the Rule 144A and registered bond market is 
evident in the comparison of means of rating indicators between the Rule 144A sample and the 
registered bond sample, as shown in Table 12.  The indicator values correspond to equivalent 
ratings for the Rule 144A bonds of Ba3 for Moody’s and just above BB- for S&P.  This is in 
comparison to the registered bonds with mean indicator values equivalent to a Moody’s rating of 
just above A3 and an S&P rating of A-.  This reflects the fact that more high-yield and non-rated 
bonds are issued in the Rule 144A market than in the registered market.   
Evaluating the bond ratings before and after the amendment, the bond rating for 
registered bonds decreased from an average Moody’s rating of A2 to Baa3 and from an S&P 
rating of A to BBB-.  The Rule 144A market showed no change in ratings before and after the 
amendment.  
I observe a decline in average amount of investment grade bonds, U.S. firms issuing 
bonds, and financial firms issuing bonds for both markets after the amendment.  Both markets 
also exhibit an increase in bonds with senior payment rank status after the amendment.  
Specifically, there is a higher average percentage of investment grade bonds in the registered 
bond market, 90.65%, over the Rule 144A market, 46.47%.  The registered bond market also has 
a higher percentage of U.S. firms (94.05% v. 72.61%), a higher percentage of senior payment 
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rank bonds (86.61% v. 68.57%) and more financial firms (75.87% v. 36.24%) than the Rule 
144A market.   
Table 13 further breaks down the variable means by year for observable trends in the 
variable means over time.  The Rule 144A liquidity premium exhibits a decrease at the start of 
the sample period with a substantial increase in 2008.  While this value has decreased from an 
average 3.25% in 2008 to an average 1.66% in 2011, the Rule 144A liquidity premium is still 
significantly higher than the 0.69% Rule 144A liquidity premium from 2003 which was the 
largest liquidity premium prior to the amendment.  In total, Table 13 reflects the overall change 
in the market composition for Rule 144A and registered bonds over the sample period. 
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CHAPTER 3:  LIQUIDITY AND THE IMPACT OF THE 2008 RULE 144a 
AMENDMENT 
 
6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Propensity Score Matching 
 
I calculate by propensity score from the following equation: 
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%144- = 1(
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&! + /-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Where: 
• Spread is the yield spread indicator of the bond 
• Amt is the amount issued in dollars 
• S&P is the S&P rating 
• Senior is an indicator for bonds with senior payment rank 
• Sector is an indicator for the bond’s industry subsector 
• Listed is an indicator if the firm issuing the bond or the parent of the firm issuing 
the bond has stock traded on a U.S. exchange 
• Year is the year the bond was issued. 
All determinates are significant in the probit regression.  The summary statistics for the 
difference in propensity scores between the Rule 144A bond and the matched registered bond is 
provided in Table 14, Panel A.  The average difference between the Rule 144A and matched 
registered bond is 0.00013 with a maximum difference of 0.00336. 
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I use a two-sample t-test18 to determine if there are significant differences between the 
propensity scores for the Rule 144A and registered bonds.  I also use a two-sample t-test to check 
if there are significant differences in the means of the variables used in the probit analysis.  
Before matching, differences are expected, but after matching, differences should not be 
significant between the Rule 144A bonds and their matched registered bond.  A summary of the 
means for the matched Rule 144A and registered bonds are provided in Table 14, Panel B.  The 
propensity score mean for the Rule 144A and registered bonds are not significantly different.  In 
addition, the means of the spread, senior payment rank and industry subsector for the Rule 144A 
and matched registered bonds are not significantly different.   
Due to my large sample size, small differences are likely to become significant even 
though the differences may be trivial.  Therefore, I visually evaluate the three variables with 
statistically significant differences: S&P rating, listed indicator and amount issued.  The mean 
for the S&P rating of the Rule 144A bonds is 12.73 compared to the matched registered bond 
means of 12.27.  An S&P indicator of 12 is equivalent to an S&P rating of BB while 13 is 
equivalent to an S&P rating of BB-.  The means of 12.73 and 12.14 are both between S&P 
ratings BB and BB-.  These differences are not large enough to impact the quality of my match.  
The differences between the means of the listed indicator for Rule 144A and registered bonds is 
.0415 with the registered bonds having a larger value for firms that have equity trading on a U.S. 
exchange.  This is not unexpected due to the fact that the Rule 144A market allows firms that are 
not already SEC reporting firms to issue bonds.  The difference in means is not large enough to 
expect an impact to the quality of the propensity score match considering the acceptability of the 
other variable matches.   
                                                 
18 In a 2008 Journal of Economic Surveys article, Caliendo and Kopeinig provide, “Some Practical Guidance for the 
Implementation of Propensity Score Matching.”  A t-test is one of the methods discussed in this article. 
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 The last variable, amount issued, has a much larger difference between the means of the 
Rule 144A bonds and their matched registered counterparts.  However, there are significant 
differences in the amount issued between the full Rule 144A and registered bond samples as 
indicated in Table 14, Panel C.  Due to this large difference between the samples I would expect 
the issued amounts to be different.  However, with the propensity score means as close as they 
are and the insignificant differences of my other variables I still find the quality of my matching 
acceptable. 
 
6.2 Regression Results 
 
I analyze my sample using OLS regression with the liquidity premium of Rule 144A 
bonds as the dependent variable.  In addition, I perform a firm FE regression because my sample 
includes firms that issue repeatedly in the Rule 144A market.  Table 15 provides the results of 
these regressions.19   
Column 1 provides the results of the OLS regression.  As seen in Column 1, the 
coefficients on time-to-maturity, amount issued, and listed equity indicator are all signed as 
predicted and statistically significant at the 1% level.  The senior and subordinate payment rank 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and signed consistent with the buy-and-
hold portfolio theory.   
Specific to the year indicators for the OLS regression in Column 1 of Table 15, the 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level for all years prior to the amendment.  The coefficients 
indicate that relative to 2008 the liquidity premium prior to the amendment is 187 to 250 bps 
                                                 
19 In unreported analysis, the financial firm indicator and registration rights indicator were not statistically 
significant in explaining the liquidity premium and were dropped from the regression results reported.   
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lower.  The coefficients on the year indicators are not statistically significant indicating there is 
no decrease in yield premiums subsequent to the amendment.   
The OLS results in Column 1 may be driven by multiple issues by individual firms; 
therefore, a firm FE regression is performed.  Column 2 of Table 15 presents the comparable 
firm FE analysis to the OLS regression.  The coefficients on time to maturity, coupon rate, 
amount issued, and senior rank are comparable and of the same significance as the OLS analysis.  
Differences between the OLS and FE regression include the significance of the subordinate 
payment rank which is statistically significant at 5% for OLS but not significant for the FE 
analysis.  Except for 2007, the year indicators are the same significance but the coefficients are 
slightly smaller than the OLS analysis.  As with the OLS analysis, the FE regressions does not 
indicate the time period after the Rule 144 amendment was statistically significant at explaining 
the liquidity premium.   
In order determine if the coefficients in the OLS regression are affected by multiple firms 
with multiple bond issues and to determine if loss of sample is causing the change in result 
between the OLS and FE analysis, I perform OLS regression on only the firms that issue one 
bond over the sample period.  These results are provided in Column 3 of Table 15.  Isolating 
away firm effects, I find the results are similar to the OLS results in coefficients and statistical 
significance.  This provides further evidence that the loss of sample does impact the results 
obtained by FE regression and further supports that the amendment to Rule 144 did not have the 
desired effect of lowering the liquidity premium. 
I also evaluate the yield spreads for Rule 144A and registered bonds in order to verify the 
results from the liquidity premium analysis.  Table 16 provides the results of the OLS and FE 
regression analysis.  Comparing the OLS analyses for the Rule 144A and registered bonds the 
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year indicators are negative and statistically significant for Rule 144A bonds prior to the 
amendment but are not statistically significant after the amendment.  The lack of significance on 
the year indicators is also present in the FE regressions.  This agrees with the findings from the 
liquidity premium analysis and reveals that the years after the amendment are not significantly 
significant in explaining the increase to the yield spread after the amendment.   
Inconsistencies between the Rule 144A bond coefficients and registered bond coefficients 
include differences in significance level and in sign.  While the callable indicator is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for the OLS and FE Rule 144A regressions the callable 
indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the registered bond OLS 
analysis but negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for the FE regression.  This 
indicates that investors value callable bonds in the Rule 144A market and this is reflected in 
lower yield spreads for callable bonds.    
 
6.3 Probit Analysis 
 
I use a probit analysis to determine if the probability of a bond having a registration rights 
agreement has declined since the 2008 amendment.  This is intended to test if the reduced 
holding period requirement resulting from the Rule 144 amendment has changed the need for 
registration rights agreements for Rule 144A issuances.  The results of this probit analysis are 
provided in Table 17.  The first column includes year indicators in the probit analysis while the 
second column only includes an indicator for bonds issued after the amendment.  Per Column 1 
of Table 17, the coefficients for 2003 through 2005 are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The coefficients for 2004 and 2005 are positive indicating the probability of a bond being issued 
with registration rights agreement are higher than the base 2008 year.  Marginal effects show that 
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a bond issued in 2004 and 2005 improves the predicted changes of having a registration rights 
agreement by approximately 13%.  The predicted chance of having a registration rights 
agreement is not statistically significant after 2005.  The coefficients after the amendment are 
negative but are not statistically significant.   
Evaluating the second column of Table 17 the coefficient on the amendment indicator is 
statistically significant and negative at the 1% level indicating that the predicted chance of 
having a registration rights agreement declines 3% after the Rule 144 amendment.  This indicates 
that the change in holding period requirements for Rule 144A bonds slightly reduced the need 
for QIBs to require registration rights agreements. 
 
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the results on the liquidity premium by 
separating the sample in two groups based on issue date before and after the Rule 144 
amendment, publicly traded firms and private firms, and firms that were U.S. firms and non-U.S. 
firms.  I also evaluate key bond characteristics by S&P ratings classification to further 
understand the coefficients on the ratings categories.  In addition, I provide further analysis 
relating to firms that issue multiple bonds in the Rule 144A market. 
Table 18 summarizes the evaluation of the sample before and after the amendment.  The 
significance and signs are the same before and after the amendment with only differences in the 
magnitude of the coefficients.  The only exception to this is the time to maturity significance 
which is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level before the amendment and 
statistically significant at the 10% level after the amendment.  This indicates that the population 
did not change as a result of the amendment. 
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 19 provide the firm FE regression results for non-U.S. and 
U.S. firms.  There are marked differences between the statistical significance of the coefficients 
for non-U.S. and U.S. firms.  The coefficients on the year indicators are negative and statistically 
significant before the amendment only for U.S. firms.  This indicates that U.S. firms had a lower 
liquidity premium prior to the amendment but that the liquidity premium for non-U.S. firms was 
not statistically different before or after the amendment. 
Evaluating the results of separating the bonds issued by public firms from non-public 
firms, Table 19, Columns 3 and 4, reveals similar coefficients in sign, magnitude and 
significance for most of the explanatory variables.  There are differences in significance for the 
year indicator coefficients.  As a large number of unlisted firms are foreign firms this could 
reflect the finding from the non-U.S. and U.S. firm comparisons provided in Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 19.   
In unreported results, the coefficients on the S&P rating categories for D and not rated 
bonds were negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This indicates that the liquidity 
premium for these bonds was less than higher rated bonds.  In order to verify these values, means 
of key bond characteristics including yield to maturity, spread, coupon, amount issued and time 
to maturity were evaluated.  These results are presented in Table 20.  Panel A contains the means 
of the entire sample of Rule 144A and registered bonds.  Panel B contains the entire sample of 
Rule 144A bonds and Panel C contains the entire sample of registered bonds.  Evaluating the 
means for these three panels, the yield to maturity, spread and coupon all increase with 
decreasing S&P rating.  The D rated bonds have a much lower yield to maturity than expected, 
on the order of BBB+ rated bonds.  As seen in Panel B, these bonds are all bonds issued under 
Rule 144A.  Further evaluation shows these are mainly multiple issues from financial firms.  The 
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Rule 144A unrated bonds have a similar yield to maturity as BB+ bonds as do the unrated 
registered bonds.  This explains why the coefficient on the rating category indicator is negative 
as these bonds have lower yield spreads and therefore lower liquidity premiums. 
Panel D of Table 20 contains the means by S&P rating category for Rule 144A bonds 
before the amendment and Panel E provides the means after the amendment.  Panel F and G 
provide the same for registered bonds, respectively.  The yield to maturity prior to the 
amendment for unrated Rule 144A bonds is similar to BB+ rated bonds and after the amendment 
the means of the yield to maturity remain similar to BB+ bonds.  The mean of the yield to 
maturity for the unrated bonds, on the other hand, were similar to BBB rated bonds before the 
amendment.  After the amendment, the average yield to maturity for unrated bonds is BB, a 
decrease from before the amendment, and lower than the unrated bonds in the Rule 144 market.  
In order to further evaluate whether firms that issue multiple bonds in the Rule 144A 
market impact regression results I first calculate the average number of issues per industry.  
Table 21 indicates that the financial industry dominates the number of repeat issues with an 
average of 27.66 Rule 144A issues per firm.   
I also evaluate the largest repeat issuers to confirm the financial industry dominance of 
multiple issues in the Rule 144A market.  The top twenty-three multiple issuers are all financial 
firms issuing a total of 866 Rule 144A bonds.   
I further assess the repeat issuers by evaluating the liquidity premium by the total number 
of issues.  Table 22 provides these results.  This table reports that, for firms issuing five or fewer 
Rule 144A bonds, the average liquidity is positive with single issuers having over a three times 
larger liquidity premium than firms that issue four or five bonds.  Firms that issue greater than 
five bonds in the Rule 144A market have a negative average liquidity premium.  This signifies 
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that bonds from large repeat issuers have a lower yield spread than their registered counterpart, 
and indicates the market values information provided by repeat issuers and reveals the market 
learns from prior issues. 
Table 23 provides the results of firm fixed effects and OLS analyses accounting for the 
repeat issuers.  Column 1 repeats the full sample firm fixed effects regression.  Column 2 
provides the results of an OLS regression on only the bonds that were issued by non-repeat 
issuing firms.  Colum 3 performs firm fixed effects regression for all firms that issue less than six 
bonds during the sample period and Column 4 is for the firms that issue more than five bonds.  I 
separated the number of issues in Column 3 and 4 based on the average liquidity premiums 
provided in Table 22.  
Comparing the four columns of Table 23, the time to maturity coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant for the full sample, the one bond issuer OLS and less than six bonds firm 
fixed effects regression.  The time to maturity is not statistically significant for determining the 
liquidity premium when the issuing firm has more than five bonds issued during the time period.  
All other coefficient variables are of the same sign and significance across the four regressions.  
The year indicators are negative and statistically significant prior to 2008.  The less than six 
issues analysis finds positive and significant coefficients on the year indicators after the 
amendment indicating that an increase in liquidity premium after the Rule 144 amendment for 
firms that issue less than six bonds. 
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6.5 Exchanged Bond Approach 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, differencing the yields for bonds issued under Rule 144A 
with their subsequently registered counterparts provides a liquidity spread attributable to the 
Rule 144A market.  A subset of the Rule 144A sample comprised only of bonds that were 
exchanged is created to evaluate this liquidity spread.  There are a total of 1,913 bonds that were 
exchanged for registered debt in this sample.  Of these 1,913 bonds, only 1,341 had exchange 
dates or trade data available in TRACE to calculate a yield.   
Table 24 provides a summary of the total exchanged bonds per year in addition to 
summary statistics on the number of days between issuance of the Rule 144A bond and 
exchange, the number of days between the issue of the Rule 144A bond and the first recorded 
trade in TRACE and the number of days between the exchange and the first recorded trade in 
TRACE.  This table shows a wide difference in the number of days between issue and exchange 
and exchange and first trade across the bonds in the sample.  Over the full sample of exchanged 
bonds, the average number of days from issuance of the Rule 144A bond to exchange is 197.17.  
The median is slightly lower at 179 and the standard deviation is large at 102.49.  The minimum 
and maximum, at 42 and 1,060, clearly represent the large differences in the number of days 
from Rule 144A issuance to exchange across the sample.   
To be able to use the exchanged bond yields, the time between the issue of the Rule 144A 
bond and the exchange has to be relatively short.  This wide swing in days to exchange across 
the sample makes using the exchanged yield less reliable.  To test this, I regress the yield spread 
found by differencing the yield of the exchanged bond on the day of the first trade with the yield 
of the Rule 144A bond on the date of issue with proxies for liquidity discussed in Section 4.3.  
These regression results were inconclusive and therefore are not reported.  A majority of the 
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coefficients were not statistically significant.  I determined that it was not possible to use the 
difference in the Rule 144A and the exchanged bond yields without further limiting the sample 
to control for the large variation in days between issuance and exchange.  This would leave very 
few sample points in the data.  Therefore, I conclude that the yield spread between the Rule 
144A and registered bonds is not an effective means to measure the liquidity in the Rule 144A 




I present my research analyzing the liquidity component of corporate bond spreads for 
bonds issued privately under Rule 144A during the period 2003 – 2011.  In addition, I evaluate 
the impact of the 2008 amendment to Rule 144 on the Rule 144A market.  The information 
gained from this research will aid in the understanding of yield premiums paid on bonds and 
contribute to a distinct sector of the debt market by evaluating a market which is highly illiquid.  
My research differs from other bond liquidity research in that it focuses directly on private debt 
issued under Rule 144A, one of the most illiquid markets.   
The results of my study find a statistically significant change in the liquidity premium 
priced into Rule 144A bonds after the SEC amended the rules governing the resale of these 
bonds.  While the SEC anticipated a decrease in the liquidity premium, my results show an 
increase in liquidity premium after the amendment documenting the Rule 144 amendment did 
not act as intended.   
 I also evaluate the yield spread of the Rule 144A bonds to determine if the spreads of the 
Rule 144A bonds were different than the spreads of the registered bonds.  As expected, the 
estimated yield spreads of the Rule 144A bonds are on average 2% higher than the registered 
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bonds.  The yield spreads of Rule 144A bonds also reflect the increase in liquidity found after the 
Rule 144 amendment. 
I further evaluate the impact of registration rights on Rule 144A to determine if the 
probability of a bond having a registration rights agreement has declined since the amendment.  
With a decrease in holding periods as a result of the amendment, QIBs may no longer require 
registration rights agreements from the issuers.  My evidence supports this and reflects a 
decrease in registration rights agreements after the amendment. 
Future research includes further evaluating foreign investment in the Rule 144A market.  
As foreign investment has overtaken domestic investment and represents over half of the capital 
raised in the Rule 144A market further insight into the international firms and the impact of the 
differences among these firms on bond yield spreads will add to the overall understanding of 
bond pricing.  In addition, analyzing the subsequent trading of restricted bonds will provide 
insight on the value investors place on public information and registration.  By comparing the 
yield spreads of Rule 144A bonds after they are free to trade with the public with equivalent 
unrestricted bonds it can be determined if Rule 144A bonds trade at a discount to non-restricted 
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Table 1: Full Sample Rule 144A and Registered Bond Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for comparison of bonds issued under Rule 144A and those registered with the SEC in my sample.  The data is for all 
coupon types without missing data in the original dataset.  Data is sorted by year.  There is a total of 17,264 Rule 144A bonds in the sample and 35,247 registered 
bonds.  Callable represents the percentage of bonds that are callable.  Senior indicates the percentage of bonds that had senior payment rank while subordinate 
represents the percentage of debt that had subordinate payment rank. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Amount Issued ( $ billion) 
144A $472.24 $480.81 $479.14 $698.54 $672.42 $338.64 $404.77 $582.39 $512.74 
Registered $398.10 $443.41 $374.87 $557.02 $662.31 $592.24 $605.34 $459.52 $571.08 
Total Number of Bonds Issued 
144A 2,343 2,455 2,416 2,956 2,752 1,113 828 1,253 1,148 
Registered 3,172 3,470 3,323 3,2091 5,927 5,569 1,625 4,966 3,986 
Average Amount of Issues ( $ million) 
144A $201.55 $195.85 $198.32 $236.31 $244.34 $304.26 $488.86 $464.80 $446.64 
Registered $125.50 $127.78 $112.81 $173.58 $111.74 $106.35 $372.52 $92.53 $143.27 
Callable 
144A 45.33% 45.34% 36.75% 30.82% 33.10% 33.42% 60.87% 57.86% 51.48% 
Registered 41.27% 40.66% 41.47% 41.07% 25.97% 17.38% 45.48% 24.81% 34.09% 
Senior          
144A 35.81% 39.31% 31.66% 29.63% 37.28% 59.12% 78.02% 81.88% 82.75% 
Registered 79.79% 84.61% 80.05% 76.29% 75.40% 89.14% 89.60% 94.28% 96.49% 
Subordinate          
144A 13.19% 11.77% 8.65% 6.50% 6.00% 5.12% 6.64% 4.47% 2.87% 





Table 2: Full Sample Rule 144A Data Statistics 
This table provides Rule 144A data statistics.  The data is for all coupon types without missing data in the original dataset.  Maturity provides the average 
maturity of bonds in years for each calendar year in the sample.  The bonds are then grouped by maturity and the total percent of the sample per year is provided 
for each maturity group.  Listed stock includes the percentage of bonds for each calendar year that are issued by firms with publicly traded stock.  Registration 
rights lists the percentage of all bonds in the sample that had registration rights agreements, and % agreement exchanged is the percent of bonds with registration 
rights agreements that are actually exchanged.  The table further breaks down registration rights by S&P rating of the bond and then provides the percent of 
bonds with registration rights that are actually exchanged broken down by S&P Rating. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Domestic Issuer          
U.S. (% total number  issued) 83.61% 81.63% 78.19% 71.38% 71.26% 72.33% 56.16% 50.36% 44.77% 
Non-U.S. (% total number issued) 16.39% 18.37% 21.81% 28.62% 28.74% 27.67% 43.84% 49.64% 55.23% 
U.S. (issue size, $ billions) $357.98 $366.00 $314.02 $402.98 $414.10 $170.14 $211.24 $277.64 $219.98 
Non-U.S.(issue size, $ billions) $114.26 $114.81 $165.12 $295.56 $258.32 $168.50 $193.53 $304.75 $292.76 
          
Maturity          
Average (years) 7.74 7.59 7.65 6.62 6.85 5.36 7.56 7.35 7.08 
>15 years 14.47% 13.32% 13.25% 11.30% 12.46% 7.19% 8.70% 5.90% 5.84% 
>7 – 15 years 26.85% 26.88% 21.11% 18.37% 20.93% 17.25% 32.49% 42.14% 39.11% 
>2 – 7 years 23.13% 25.13% 24.00% 27.60% 22.46% 21.83% 39.85% 38.79% 39.55% 
< 2 years 35.55% 34.67% 41.64% 42.73% 44.15% 53.73% 18.96% 13.17% 15.50% 
          
Registration Rights          
Agreement 13.06% 23.01% 16.85% 12.65% 12.94% 11.77% 29.47% 28.73% 25.35% 
% Agreement Exchanged 66.34% 67.61% 66.58% 48.93% 50.00% 52.67% 64.34% 60.83% 44.67% 
Registration Rights by S&P Rating          
Inv. Grade 18.63% 16.11% 21.13% 23.80% 20.22% 33.59% 22.54% 16.95% 14.78% 
High Yield 78.76% 76.81% 68.30% 61.76% 55.90% 51.91% 74.59% 79.72% 80.41% 
Not Ranked 2.61% 7.08% 10.57% 14.44% 23.88% 14.50% 2.87% 3.33% 4.81% 
% Exchanged per S&P Rating          
Inv. Grade 49.12% 61.54% 60.47% 33.71% 61.11% 43.18% 56.36% 36.07% 13.95% 
High Yield 72.61% 74.19% 76.26% 64.94% 65.83% 70.59% 68.68% 66.90% 50.43% 
Not Ranked 0.00% 10.00% 16.28% 5.56% 3.53% 10.53% 14.29% 41.67% 42.86% 
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Table 3: Full Sample Rule 144A and Registered Bond Coupon Types 
This table presents a comparison the coupon type for the bonds in the Rule 144A and registered bond samples.  The data is for all coupon types without missing 
data in the original dataset.  Note that Bloomberg overwrites the coupon type when payment on a bond is in default or when the bond has been exchanged.  In 
these cases, the coupon type is changed to reflect the default or exchange action.  Data is organized by year. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DEFAULTED          
144A 1.54% 2.00% 1.86% 4.50% 9.85% 2.52% 0.97% 0.48% 0.26% 
Registered 3.37% 3.31% 3.58% 3.55% 5.13% 4.44% 0.12% 0.02% 0.03% 
EXCHANGED          
144A 18.14% 19.51% 13.04% 6.66% 7.41% 7.28% 19.69% 18.28% 11.50% 
Registered 0.22% 0.17% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.02% 5.66% 2.26% 0.28% 
FIXED          
144A 30.04% 26.43% 22.56% 22.10% 27.18% 43.38% 53.25% 55.46% 60.54% 
Registered 77.69% 72.37% 72.56% 63.23% 66.86% 61.48% 60.80% 57.83% 47.31% 
FLOATING          
144A 42.64% 44.93% 54.30% 58.15% 45.35% 31.36% 19.57% 16.68% 12.98% 
Registered 11.79% 11.99% 10.98% 14.12% 5.52% 4.11% 5.17% 2.05% 4.14% 
STEP CPN          
144A 0.68% 0.77% 0.58% 0.61% 0.47% 0.72% 0.24% 0.72% 0.35% 
Registered 3.34% 4.41% 2.65% 0.31% 0.13% 0.32% 0.37% 4.49% 6.65% 
VARIABLE          
144A 4.57% 4.24% 4.14% 4.97% 6.29% 7.28% 4.47% 6.07% 7.58% 
Registered 1.51% 5.36% 6.47% 6.64% 3.26% 4.26% 7.02% 8.16% 10.91% 
ZERO COUPON          
144A 2.39% 2.12% 3.52% 3.01% 3.45% 7.46% 1.81% 2.31% 6.79% 
Registered 2.08% 2.39% 3.67% 12.06% 19.00% 25.37% 20.86% 25.19% 30.68% 




Table 4: Full Sample Rule 144A and Registered Bond Issuer Home Countries 
This table summarizes the issuing home countries for Rule 144A and registered bonds.  The data is for all coupon types without missing data in the original 
dataset.   
Panel A: This panel provides the proportion of home countries in both the Rule 144A and registered bond markets.  
Rule 144A Registered 
Issuer Home Country Proportion of Issuances Issuer Home Country Proportion of Issuance 
United States 71.47% United States 71.04% 
Cayman Islands 6.12% Britain 13.76% 
Britain 4.16% Netherlands 4.05% 
Australia 2.37% Canada 3.13% 
Netherlands 1.76% Germany 2.88% 
Canada 1.58% Switzerland 1.95% 
Ireland 1.11% Norway 1.36% 
Germany 1.08% Sweden 0.79% 
Luxembourg 0.92% Other 1.04% 
France 0.91%   
Bermuda 0.89%   
Switzerland 0.82%   
Brazil 0.75%   
OTHER (59 Countries) 6.06%   
 























U.S. 144A 83.61% 81.63% 78.19% 71.38% 71.26% 72.33% 56.16% 50.36% 44.77% 71.47% 




Table 5: Full Sample Rule 144A and Registered Bond Ratings 
This table provides a summary of bond ratings for Rule 144A and registered bonds.  The data is for all coupon types without missing data in the original dataset.  
Panel A contains the data summary for Moody’s bond ratings and Panel B contains the data summary for S&P bond ratings. 
 
Panel A: This panel provides a summary of Rule 144A and registered bonds’ Moody’s ratings based on the bonds being classified as investment grade (≥Baa3), 
high-yield (less than Baa3) or is not rated by Moody’s. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Investment Grade          
Rule 144A 34.87% 38.74% 56.46% 52.84% 43.79% 27.31% 34.54% 34.40% 31.88% 
Registered 93.22% 92.16% 91.60% 89.65% 63.30% 48.00% 51.32% 26.80% 41.77% 
          
High-Yield          
Rule 144A 22.24% 22.04% 16.18% 12.38% 14.43% 9.97% 31.52% 39.51% 34.67% 
Registered 1.99% 2.33% 1.38% 2.46% 1.01% 0.48% 8.86% 3.20% 2.33% 
          
Not Rated          
Rule 144A 42.89% 39.22% 27.36% 34.78% 41.78% 62.72% 33.94% 26.09% 33.45% 
Registered 4.79% 5.51% 7.02% 7.89% 35.69% 51.52% 39.82% 70.00% 55.90% 
Panel B: This panel provides a summary of Rule 144A and registered bonds’ S&P ratings based on the bonds being classified as investment grade (≥BBB-), 
high-yield (less than BBB-) or is not rated by S&P. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Investment Grade          
Rule 144A 58.34% 50.63% 60.64% 58.12% 46.69% 33.69% 34.66% 33.04% 29.79% 
Registered 96.56% 94.50% 89.29% 82.42% 46.48% 29.38% 48.43% 24.37% 44.36% 
          
High-Yield          
Rule 144A 23.64% 24.77% 17.18% 14.58% 18.17% 10.69% 35.51% 39.98% 36.06% 
Registered 1.77% 2.13% 1.29% 2.56% 1.21% 0.63% 8.49% 3.08% 2.18% 
          
Not Rated          
Rule 144A 18.02% 24.60% 22.18% 27.30% 35.14% 55.62% 29.83% 26.98% 34.15% 




Table 6: Fixed Coupon Rule 144A and Registered Bond Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for comparison of bonds issued under Rule 144A and those registered with the SEC in my sample.  The data is only for 
fixed coupon bonds without missing data.  Table 1 provides a comparison table that includes all coupon types in the original sample without missing data.  Data 
is sorted by year.  There is a total of 6,465 Rule 144A bonds in the sample and 15,289 registered bonds.  Callable represents the percentage of bonds that are 
callable.  Senior indicates the percentage of bonds that had senior payment rank while subordinate represents the percentage of debt that had subordinate payment 
rank. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Amount Issued ( $ billion) 
144A $249.87  $219.96  $170.05  $218.40  $263.66  $142.67  $327.15  $495.70  $415.88  
Registered $234.87  $196.06  $153.61  $229.79  $329.95  $374.12  $462.07  $353.30  $426.48  
Total Number of Bonds Issued 
144A 910 864 681 725 840 303 554 862 726 
Registered 2413 2349 2154 1677 1825 1284 895 1208 1484 
Average Amount of Issues ( $ million) 
144A $273.69  $254.58  $248.98  $297.15  $312.02  $467.77  $590.52  $575.06  $572.84  
Registered $97.33  $83.47  $71.31  $137.03  $180.79  $291.37  $516.27  $292.47  $287.19  
Callable 
144A 68.02% 67.13% 68.37% 63.27% 53.96% 70.82% 78.16% 75.52% 74.66% 
Registered 42.64% 44.10% 51.49% 65.06% 63.84% 52.34% 61.12% 61.42% 60.07% 
Senior          
144A 61.77% 58.68% 63.54% 54.56% 50.65% 81.31% 87.00% 86.31% 87.19% 
Registered 86.66% 89.83% 86.68% 87.48% 88.16% 84.58% 95.31% 96.61% 97.71% 
Subordinate          
144A 16.21% 16.90% 12.74% 8.30% 6.63% 7.87% 5.78% 4.99% 2.34% 





Table 7: Fixed Coupon Sample Rule 144A Data Statistics 
This table provides Rule 144A data statistics.  The data is only for fixed coupon bonds without missing data.  Table 2 provides a comparison table that includes 
all coupon types in the original sample without missing data.  Maturity provides the average maturity of bonds in years for each calendar year in the sample.  The 
bonds are then grouped by maturity and the total percent of the sample per year is provided for each maturity group.  Listed stock includes the percentage of 
bonds for each calendar year that are issued by firms with publicly traded stock.  Registration rights lists the percentage of all bonds in the sample that had 
registration rights agreements, and % agreement exchanged is the percent of bonds with registration rights agreements that are actually exchanged.  The table 
further breaks down registration rights by S&P rating of the bond and then provides the percent of bonds with registration rights that are actually exchanged 
broken down by S&P Rating. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Domestic Issuer          
U.S. (% total number  issued) 83.46% 79.75% 76.13% 75.24% 77.28% 72.13% 67.87% 62.18% 55.51% 
Non-U.S. (% total number issued) 16.54% 20.25% 23.87% 24.76% 22.72% 27.87% 32.13% 37.82% 44.49% 
U.S. (issue size, $ billions) $185.03 $160.81 $120.77 $145.08 $176.27 $90.10 $188.61 $254.11 $190.17 
Non-U.S.(issue size, $ billions) $64.84 $59.14 $49.29 $73.32 $87.38 $52.57 $138.54 $241.58 $225.71 
          
Maturity          
Average (years) 9.46 9.90 9.77 10.11 9.72 8.70 8.14 8.28 8.49 
>15 years 8.32% 8.45% 11.57% 9.52% 10.06% 7.87% 8.30% 5.80% 5.92% 
>7 – 15 years 56.19% 57.06% 51.24% 44.76% 38.82% 48.85% 46.39% 56.03% 57.85% 
>2 – 7 years 23.66% 24.54% 25.77% 24.76% 18.82% 38.03% 42.60% 36.54% 35.12% 
< 2 years 11.83% 9.95% 11.42% 20.95% 32.31% 5.25% 2.71% 1.62% 1.10% 
          
Registration Rights          
Agreement 28.15% 46.18% 41.14% 29.52% 24.14% 33.11% 42.78% 40.49% 39.26% 
% Agreement Exchanged 71.98% 78.20% 77.58% 71.89% 75.49% 61.39% 66.24% 62.18% 43.86% 
Registration Rights by S&P Rating          
Inv. Grade 16.73% 20.80% 24.91% 21.20% 24.51% 37.62% 22.36% 17.19% 15.09% 
High Yield 82.10% 78.95% 72.60% 76.96% 72.06% 58.42% 75.95% 80.52% 80.70% 
Not Ranked 1.17% 0.25% 2.49% 1.84% 3.43% 3.96% 1.69% 2.29% 4.21% 
% Exchanged per S&P Rating          
Inv. Grade 58.14% 65.06% 62.86% 52.17% 76.00% 44.74% 58.49% 35.00% 13.95% 
High Yield 75.83% 81.59% 82.84% 77.25% 77.55% 74.58% 69.44% 67.97% 50.00% 
Not Ranked 0.00% 100.00% 71.43% 75.00% 28.57% 25.00% 25.00% 62.50% 33.33% 
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Table 8: Fixed Coupon Rule 144A and Registered Bond Issuer Home Countries 
This table summarizes the issuing home countries for Rule 144A and registered bonds.  Table 4 provides a comparison table that includes all coupon types in the 
original sample without missing data.  The data is only for fixed coupon bonds without missing data. 
Panel A: This panel provides the proportion of home countries in both the Rule 144A and registered bond markets.  
Rule 144A Registered 
Issuer Home Country Proportion of Issuances Issuer Home Country Proportion of Issuance 
United States 72.64% United States 94.05% 
Cayman Islands 3.30% Britain 3.85% 
Canada 2.99% Canada 0.33% 
Britain 2.27% Australia 0.22% 
Netherlands 2.03% Switzerland 0.20% 
Luxembourg 1.74% Netherlands 0.17% 
Australia 1.65% Cayman Islands 0.16% 
Brazil 1.36% France 0.14% 
Mexico 1.34% Other 0.88% 
South Korea 0.96%   
France 0.86%   
Bermuda 0.79%   
Ireland 0.62%   
Chile 0.57%   
Argentina 0.54%   
British Virgin 0.51%   
Other 5.84%   
 



















U.S. 144A 83.46% 79.75% 76.13% 75.24% 77.28% 72.13% 67.87% 62.18% 55.51% 





Table 9: Full Sample Rule 144A and Registered Bond Ratings 
This table provides a summary of bond ratings for Rule 144A and registered bonds.  The data is only for fixed coupon bonds without missing data.  Table 5 
provides a comparison table that includes all coupon types in the original sample without missing data.  Panel A contains the data summary for Moody’s bond 
ratings and Panel B contains the data summary for S&P bond ratings. 
 
Panel A: This panel provides a summary of Rule 144A and registered bonds’ Moody’s ratings based on the bonds being classified as investment grade (≥Baa3), 
high-yield (less than Baa3) or is not rated by Moody’s. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Investment Grade          
Rule 144A 35.38% 30.44% 39.39% 44.63% 35.86% 39.02% 38.09% 33.76% 35.67% 
Registered 93.45% 94.21% 94.48% 93.50% 93.59% 82.55% 72.40% 67.47% 71.99% 
          
High-Yield          
Rule 144A 45.67% 44.44% 42.17% 36.60% 36.69% 29.51% 46.75% 55.57% 53.31% 
Registered 1.86% 2.04% 1.49% 3.04% 2.36% 1.64% 15.20% 12.83% 6.06% 
          
Not Rated          
Rule 144A 18.95% 25.12% 18.45% 18.78% 27.46% 31.48% 15.16% 10.67% 11.02% 
Registered 4.68% 3.75% 4.04% 3.46% 4.05% 15.81% 12.40% 19.70% 21.95% 
Panel B: This panel provides a summary of Rule 144A and registered bonds’ S&P ratings based on the bonds being classified as investment grade (≥BBB-), 
high-yield (less than BBB-) or is not rated by S&P. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Investment Grade          
Rule 144A 43.59% 33.91% 41.29% 44.08% 37.16% 43.28% 38.81% 32.02% 32.09% 
Registered 98.01% 97.57% 95.26% 92.73% 90.63% 83.33% 74.19% 68.13% 72.73% 
          
High-Yield          
Rule 144A 44.14% 46.76% 43.05% 39.73% 42.96% 30.16% 46.75% 53.02% 51.93% 
Registered 1.53% 1.70% 1.21% 2.86% 1.92% 1.64% 13.97% 12.50% 5.59% 
          
Not Rated          
Rule 144A 12.27% 19.33% 15.67% 16.19% 19.88% 26.56% 14.44% 14.97% 15.98% 




Table 10: Correlations for Rule 144A Sample 
This table presents the pairwise correlations for the Rule 144A variables used in analysis.   Liquidity is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A 
and matched registered bond; Yield Spread is the spread between the 144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Yield-to-Maturity is the 
yield of the fixed coupon bond if held to maturity; Yrs to Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is 
the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Moody’s rating is an indicator assigned corresponding to the bond’s Moody’s rating with Aaa = 1, increasing in value as 
the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; S&P Rating is an indicator assigned corresponding to the bond’s S&P rating with AAA = 1, increasing in value as the 
rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; MoodyS&P Rating is the indicator variable corresponding to each unique Moody’s and S&P pair; Rating difference is the 
difference between the S&P and Moody’s ratings; Investment grade is an indicator for Moody’s≥Baa3 and S&P≥BBB- ; Amendment is 0 for before February 15, 
2008 and 1 after; U.S. is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the bond has 
subordinate payment rank;  Financial is 1 if the bond was issued by a financial firm; High rate is 1 if Moody’s≥ Aa3 or S&P≥AA-; Reg rights is 1 if the bond has 
a registration rights agreement; Treas Proxy1 is the Treasury proxy for one-period off the run and on the run differences; and, Treas Proxy2 is the Treasury proxy 




















Liquidity Premium 1.0000          
Yield Spread 0.7060* 1.0000         
Yield-to-Maturity 0.6438* 0.9302* 1.0000        
Yrs to Maturity -0.0567* -0.0706* 0.0547* 1.0000       
Coupon 0.5091* 0.7956* 0.8856* 0.0970* 1.0000      
Amount Issued 0.0231 0.0215 -0.0461* 0.0880* -0.0639* 1.0000     
Moody’s Rating 0.2020* 0.3646* 0.3635* -0.0562* 0.3776* -0.2646* 1.0000    
S&P Rating 0.1407* 0.3735* 0.3958* -0.0267 0.4202* -0.1599* 0.5469* 1.0000   
MoodyS&P 0.1459* 0.3800* 0.4017* -0.0285 0.4262* -0.1672* 0.5759* 0.9994* 1.0000  
Rating difference -0.0616* 0.0155 0.0402* 0.0303 0.0514* 0.1066* -0.4632* 0.4886* 0.4578* 1.0000 
Investment grade -0.2695* -0.5372* -0.5534* 0.1120* -0.6097* 0.1689* -0.6430* -0.6844* -0.6952* -0.0544* 
Amendment 0.2446* 0.3439* 0.1187* 0.0122 0.0947* 0.3213* -0.0165 0.0421* 0.0405* 0.0618* 
U.S. -0.0364* -0.0042 0.0404* -0.0008 0.0384* -0.2469* 0.1377* 0.0471* 0.0518* -0.0937* 
Senior 0.1796* 0.3285* 0.2960* 0.1414* 0.3409* 0.2452* 0.0372* 0.0962* 0.0955* 0.0631* 
Subordinate 0.0364* 0.0900* 0.1433* 0.1059* 0.1719* -0.0548* 0.1016* 0.1322* 0.1334* 0.0340* 
Financial -0.2056* -0.3744* -0.3864* -0.2367* -0.4465* -0.1146* -0.1781* -0.1958* -0.1986* -0.0217 
High Rate -0.2091* -0.4147* -0.4309* -0.2183* -0.4736* -0.0095 -0.4591* -0.5732* -0.5789* -0.1283* 
Reg Rights 0.0814* 0.2460* 0.2657* 0.0926* 0.3118* 0.1194* 0.0886* 0.0867* 0.0883* -0.0006 
Treas Proxy1 0.0826* 0.1100* 0.0885* -0.0210 0.0854* 0.0541* -0.0286 0.0184 0.0168 0.0493* 













Investment grade 1.0000          
Amendment -0.0381* 1.0000         
U.S. -0.1531* -0.1756* 1.0000        
Senior -0.2471* 0.2944* -0.1424* 1.0000       
Subordinate -0.1879* -0.1258* 0.0841* 0.0404* 1.0000      
Financial 0.3331* -0.1623* -0.0521* -0.5008* -0.0746* 1.0000     
High Rate 0.5046* -0.1494* -0.0077 -0.3724* -0.1172* 0.5575* 1.0000    
Reg Rights -0.2869* 0.0627* 0.2702* 0.3408* 0.1573* -0.4418* -0.3243* 1.0000   
Treas Proxy1 -0.0336* 0.1311* -0.0248 0.0728* 0.0094 -0.0673* -0.0695* 0.0229 1.0000  




Table 11: Correlations for Registered Bond Sample 
This table presents the pairwise correlations for the registered bond variables used in analysis.  Yield Spread is the spread between the 144A bond yield to 
maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Yield-to-Maturity is the yield of the fixed coupon bond if held to maturity; Yrs to Maturity is the time to maturity at 
issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Moody’s rating is an indicator assigned corresponding 
to the bond’s Moody’s rating with Aaa = 1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; S&P Rating is an indicator assigned corresponding to 
the bond’s S&P rating with AAA = 1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; MoodyS&P Rating is the indicator variable corresponding 
to each unique Moody’s and S&P pair; Rating difference is the difference between the S&P and Moody’s ratings; Investment grade is an indicator for 
Moody’s≥Baa3 and S&P≥BBB- ; Amendment is 0 for before February 15, 2008 and 1 after; U.S. is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States; Senior is 1 
if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the bond has subordinate payment rank;  Financial is 1 if the bond was issued by a financial firm; High 
rate is 1 if Moody’s≥ Aa3 or S&P≥AA-; Treas Proxy1 is the Treasury proxy for one-period off the run and on the run differences; and, Treas Proxy2 is the 















Yield-to-Maturity 1.0000        
Yield Spread 0.7877* 1.0000       
Yrs to Maturity 0.2047* -0.1523* 1.0000      
Coupon 0.9898* 0.7732* 0.2106* 1.0000     
Amount Issued 0.0445* 0.0974* 0.0343* 0.0367* 1.0000    
Moody’s Rating 0.3454* 0.5734* -0.2798* 0.3434* -0.0443* 1.0000   
S&P Rating 0.3962* 0.5948* -0.2380* 0.3954* -0.0223* 0.8226* 1.0000  
MoodyS&P 0.3969* 0.5983* -0.2416* 0.3961* -0.0234* 0.8363* 0.9997* 1.0000 
Rating difference 0.0653* 0.0045 0.0839* 0.0674* 0.0387* -0.3463* 0.2486* 0.2247* 
Investment grade -0.4449* -0.6324* 0.2560* -0.4403* 0.0235* -0.7762* -0.8072* -0.8118* 
Amendment 0.1505* 0.5271* -0.1202* 0.1421* 0.2240* 0.3089* 0.3325* 0.3339* 
U.S. 0.0266* -0.1099* 0.0254* 0.0346* -0.0915* -0.0173 -0.0511* -0.0500* 
Senior 0.0172 0.0543* -0.0204 0.0140 0.0379* -0.1333* -0.1702* -0.1699* 
Subordinate 0.1061* -0.0500* 0.3253* 0.1104* -0.0549* -0.1034* -0.0086 -0.0127 
Financial -0.1233* -0.1557* -0.0912* -0.1156* -0.2994* -0.1405* -0.1256* -0.1271* 






Amendment U.S. Senior Subordinate Financial High rate 
Rating difference 1.0000        
Investment grade -0.0096 1.0000       
Amendment 0.0224* -0.3228* 1.0000      
U.S. -0.0548* 0.0521* -0.2950* 1.0000     
Senior -0.0537* 0.1158* 0.0908* -0.0612* 1.0000    
Subordinate 0.1620* 0.0354* -0.1207* 0.0608* -0.3593* 1.0000   
Financial 0.0322* 0.0325* -0.2213* -0.0036 -0.0388* 0.1208* 1.0000  
High rate 0.0499* 0.2415* -0.1534* -0.1349* -0.0438* 0.0853* 0.2827* 1.0000 
* p<.01  
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Table 12: Means of Variables  
This table provides a summary of the means of variables used in the regression analysis.  The first column summarizes the means for the full sample of bonds 
which include both the Rule 144A and registered bonds.  The second and third columns summarize the means for Rule 144A and registered bonds , respectively.  
The remaining columns summarize the means for the full sample, Rule 144A bonds and registered bonds before and after the amendment to Rule 144 on Feb. 15, 
2008.  Liquidity is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A and matched registered bond; Spread is the spread between the 144A bond yield to 
maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; YTM is the yield of the fixed coupon bond if held to maturity; Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon 
is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Moody is an indicator assigned corresponding to the bond’s Moody’s rating 
with Aaa=1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; S&P is an indicator assigned corresponding to the bond’s S&P rating with AAA = 
1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; Rating dif is the difference between the S&P and Moody’s ratings; Invest. grade is an indicator 
for Moody’s≥Baa3 and S&P≥BBB- ; U.S. is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 
if the bond has subordinate payment rank; Financial is 1 if the bond was issued by a financial firm; High rate is 1 if Moody’s≥ Aa3 or S&P≥AA-; and Equity 
listed is 1 if the issuer or the issuer’s parent company has stock publicly traded on a U.S. exchange.  The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 
2011.  
    Full Sample Rule 144A Registered 












          
Liquidity - 0.0002 - - - -0.0079 0.0139 - - 
Spread 0.0214 0.0358* 0.0152* 0.0133* 0.0378* 0.0275* 0.0497* 0.0079* 0.0316* 
YTM 0.0575 0.0719* 0.0514* 0.0550* 0.0625* 0.0691* 0.0765* 0.0496* 0.0554* 
Maturity 9.3121 8.4024* 9.6967* 9.7734* 8.3699* 8.3433 8.5013 10.3213* 8.3027* 
Coupon 0.0569 0.0704* 0.0512* 0.0548* 0.0612* 0.0684* 0.0736* 0.0495* 0.0549* 
Amount 2.42E+08 3.86E+08* 1.81E+08* 1.59E+08* 4.10E+08* 2.79E+08* 5.66E+08* 1.13E+08* 3.30E+08* 
Moody20 7.0944 10.6739* 5.7544* 6.5373* 8.3376* 10.3059 11.2314 5.3629* 6.7792* 
S&P21 7.1062 10.6921* 5.7356* 6.5850* 8.3038* 10.4009* 11.1761* 5.3280* 6.8075* 
MSP 186.9557 282.6950* 146.4720* 162.4164* 237.0671* 277.6756* 291.0847* 118.2581* 209.4361* 
Rating Dif -0.2001 -0.2880 -0.1629 -0.3175* 0.0397* -0.5956* 0.2260* -0.2109* -0.0556* 
Invest. Grade 0.7752 0.4647* 0.9065* 0.8337* 0.6559* 0.4794* 0.4401* 0.9694* 0.7662* 
U.S. 0.8768 0.7261* 0.9405* 0.9317* 0.7648* 0.7867* 0.6248* 0.9872* 0.8364* 
Senior 0.8335 0.6857* 0.8961* 0.7951* 0.9120* 0.5800* 0.8624* 0.8775* 0.9374* 
Subordinate 0.0803 0.0942* 0.0744* 0.1031* 0.0337* 0.1226* 0.0467* 0.0956* 0.0271* 
Financial 0.6409 0.3624* 0.7587* 0.7115* 0.4969* 0.4227* 0.2616* 0.8221* 0.6172* 
High Rate 0.3076 0.1810* 0.3612* 0.3592* 0.2022* 0.2255* 0.1066* 0.4105* 0.2511* 
Equity Listed 0.6013 0.3757* 0.6966* 0.6350* 0.5324* 0.3839 0.3620 0.7312* 0.6195* 
* statistically different at 1% level  
                                                 
20 Averages for Moody’s ratings only include those indicators for bonds with ratings.  Bonds without ratings, noted by an indicator equal to 23, are not included 
in Moody averages. 
21 Averages for S&P ratings only include those indicators for bonds with ratings.  Bonds without ratings, noted by an indicator equal to 23, are not included in 
S&P averages. 
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Table 13: Means of Variables by Year 
This table provides a summary variable means by year.  Each variable contains the mean for each year for the full sample that includes both Rule 144A and registered 
bonds, and the Rule 144A and registered bond means separately.   Liquidity is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A and matched registered bond; 
Spread is the spread between the 144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; YTM is the yield of the fixed coupon bond if held to maturity; Maturity 
is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Moody is an indicator assigned 
corresponding to the bond’s Moody’s rating with Aaa = 1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23; S&P is an indicator assigned corresponding to 
the bond’s S&P rating with AAA = 1, increasing in value as the rating decreases with Not Rated = 23;MSP is an indicator for each unique pair of S&P and Moody’s 
rating with S&P=1, Moody=1 as 1, S&P=1 and Moody=2 as 2 and so on; Rating dif is the difference between the S&P and Moody’s ratings; Invest. grade is an indicator 
for Moody’s≥Baa3 and S&P≥BBB- ; U.S. is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the 
bond has subordinate payment rank;  Financial is 1 if the bond was issued by a financial firm; High rate is 1 if Moody’s≥ Aa3 or S&P≥AA-; Equity listed is 1 if the issuer 
or the issuer’s parent company has stock publicly traded on a U.S. exchange; and .Reg rights is an indicator equal to 1 if the bond has a registration rights agreement.  The 
sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011. 
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
          
Liquidity          
Rule 144A -.0035424 -.0105603 -.0048101 -.0106245 -.0103674 .0201549 .0158466 .0116865 .0118383 
Spread          
Full Sample .0153203 .0120696 .0113244 .012766 .0145075 .0312969 .0433297 .0394143 .0360076 
Rule 144A .0322139 .0291621 0.027485 0.023401 0.023687 0.05723 0.053669 0.049117 0.044262 
Registered 0.008949 0.005783 0.006215 0.008168 0.010283 0.025177 0.03693 0.032491 0.03197 
YTM          
Full Sample .0506141 .0515216 .0531864 .0611372 .0610907 .0629084 .0694977 .0630743 .0566687 
Rule 144A 0.066664 0.067161 0.069275 0.071679 0.071106 0.090649 0.082238 0.074602 0.068644 
Registered 0.044562 0.045769 0.0481 0.05658 0.056481 0.056362 0.061612 0.054848 0.05081 
Maturity          
Full Sample 9.457276 9.899113 9.762374 10.10087 9.715885 8.695452 8.139345 8.280909 8.495776 
Rule 144A 8.725958 8.731466 9.068932 7.906022 7.310218 8.643034 8.684833 8.351538 8.48423 
Registered 9.733073 10.32859 9.98161 11.04975 10.82315 8.707822 7.801691 8.23051 8.501425 
Coupon          
Full Sample 5.049337 5.117768 5.295213 6.099866 6.075105 6.08379 6.699154 6.220577 5.636149 
Rule 144A 6.646426 6.595042 6.834472 7.141755 7.021289 8.053868 7.784559 7.319025 6.819678 
Registered 4.447036 4.574403 4.808566 5.649437 5.639601 5.618889 6.027294 5.436751 5.057146 
Amount          
Full Sample 1.46e+08 1.29e+08 1.14e+08 1.85e+08 2.22e+08 3.25e+08 5.45e+08 4.10e+08 3.81e+08 
Rule 144A 2.74E+08 2.55E+08 2.50E+08 2.97E+08 3.13E+08 4.68E+08 5.91E+08 5.75E+08 5.73E+08 
Registered 9.73E+07 8.35E+07 7.13E+07 1.37E+08 1.81E+08 2.91E+08 5.16E+08 2.92E+08 2.87E+08 
Moody          
Full Sample 8.22269 8.1385 7.541799 7.778934 8.370356 9.36799 10.9303 11.47585 10.93756 
Rule 144A 13.30879 14.4456 12.45668 11.49103 13.28452 14.17822 12.787 12.78422 12.62534 
Registered 6.3046 5.818646 5.987929 6.17412 6.108493 8.232866 9.781006 10.54222 10.11186 
S&P          
Full Sample 7.270238 7.510738 7.366843 7.917569 8.662289 9.073094 10.77985 11.64976 11.18235 
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Table 13: Means of Variables by Year (cont.) 
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Rule 144A 11.74505 13.43519 12.13803 11.6069 13.3631 13.24092 12.59206 13.25754 13.29339 
Registered 5.582677 5.33163 5.858403 6.3226 6.49863 8.089564 9.658101 10.50248 10.1496 
MSP          
Full Sample 152.4382 157.8855 153.9792 166.883 184.603 195.0491 235.8668 256.4203 245.1317 
Rule 144A 260.4451 300.4549 268.6314 255.4497 297.6357 295.7195 279.4043 294.7077 295.3733 
Registered 111.7062 105.4461 117.7312 128.5939 132.577 171.2928 208.9173 229.0993 220.5526 
Rating Dif          
Full Sample -.9524526 -.6277622 -.1749559 .1386345 .2919325 -.294896 -.1504486 .173913 .2447964 
Rule 144A -1.56374 -1.01042 -0.31865 0.115862 0.078571 -0.93729 -0.19495 0.473318 0.668044 
Registered -0.72192 -0.48702 -0.12953 0.148479 0.390137 -0.1433 -0.12291 -0.03974 0.037736 
Invest. Grade          
Full Sample .851941 .8325552 .8518519 .8251457 .8003752 .7851292 .6425121 .5922705 .6447964 
Rule 144A 0.491209 0.413194 0.494861 0.535172 0.476191 0.50165 0.445848 0.423434 0.428375 
Registered 0.987982 0.986803 0.964717 0.950507 0.949589 0.852025 0.764246 0.712748 0.750674 
U.S.          
Full Sample .9476377 .9399315 .9361552 .9109076 .9133208 .9218652 .8357488 .7173913 .6651584 
Rule 144A 0.834066 0.797454 0.760646 0.751724 0.772619 0.722772 0.6787 0.62181 0.555096 
Registered 0.990468 0.992337 0.991644 0.979726 0.978082 0.968847 0.932961 0.785596 0.719003 
Senior          
Full Sample .798074 .8145036 .8116402 .7768526 .7639775 .8393195 .9213251 .9231884 .9425339 
Rule 144A 0.616484 0.586806 0.637298 0.550345 0.508333 0.811881 0.870036 0.863109 0.871901 
Registered 0.866556 0.898255 0.86676 8.75E-01 0.881644 0.845794 0.953073 0.96606 0.977089 
Subordinate          
Full Sample .0929883 .1195145 .1093474 .1061615 .0885553 .0775047 .0338164 .0275362 .0104072 
Rule 144A 0.161539 0.168982 0.126285 0.081379 0.065476 0.079208 0.057762 0.049884 0.023416 
Registered 0.067136 0.10132 0.103993 1.17E-01 0.099178 0.077103 0.018994 0.011589 0.004043 
Financial          
Full Sample .6307553 .7226891 .7541446 .7348043 .7339587 .6219282 .3416149 .4782609 .5402715 
Rule 144A 0.321978 0.358796 0.399413 0.502069 0.55 0.247525 0.205776 0.291183 0.278237 
Registered 0.747203 0.856535 0.866295 8.35E-01 0.81863 0.71028 0.425698 0.611755 0.668464 
High Rate          
Full Sample .295817 .3688142 .3481481 .3713572 .4255159 .3068683 .1145618 .1816425 .2180995 
Rule 144A 0.179121 0.12963 0.208517 0.33931 0.291667 0.132013 0.092058 0.105568 0.110193 
Registered 0.339826 0.45679 0.392293 3.85E-01 0.487123 0.348131 0.128492 0.235927 0.27089 
Equity Listed          
Full Sample 0.626843 0.678805 0.631393 0.629475 0.600000 0.659105 0.620428 0.476812 0.444796 
Rule 144A 0.489011 0.444444 0.380323 0.311724 0.271429 0.39604 0.415163 0.343388 0.331956 
Registered 0.678823 0.765006 0.710771 0.766846 0.751233 0.721184 0.747486 0.57202 0.500000 
Reg Rights          
Rule 144A .2824176 .4618056 .4126285 .297931 .2428571 .3333333 .4277978 .4048724 .392562 
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Table 14: Propensity Score Matching Quality 
This table provides the summary data for determining the quality of the propensity score matching where Rule 144A 
bonds are the treatment group and registered bonds are the control group.  The propensity score was calculated for 
the treatment (Rule 144A bonds) and control group (registered bonds).  Propensity score was calculated using the 
yield spread, amount issued, S&P rating, senior payment rank indicator, bond’s subsector, the listing status of the 
firm and the year the bond was issued.  Panel A provides a data summary of the difference in propensity scores 
between the Rule 144A and matched registered bonds.  Panel B provides the t-test results for the means of the 
propensity score dependent variables and Panel C provides the summary statistics for the amount issued of 6,465 
Rule 144A and 15,289 registered bonds. 
 
Panel A: This panel provides the average difference in propensity score between the Rule 144A sample and the 
matched registered bonds.  The mean of the difference, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
are provided.  The propensity score was calculated for the treatment (Rule 144A bonds) and control group 
(registered bonds).  Propensity score was calculated using the yield spread, amount issued, S&P rating, senior 
payment rank indicator, bond’s subsector, the listing status of the firm and the year the bond was issued. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Propensity Score 
Difference 
.0001312 .0000535 .0002466 0 .0033686 
 
Panel B: This panel provides the means of propensity score variables, the difference in the means and indicates if the 
difference is statistically significant using a two-sample t-test.  Before matching, differences are expected, but after 






Propensity score 0.5094 0.5094 0.0000 
Spread 0.0358 0.0356 0.0002 
S&P Rating 12.7253 12.2670 .4583*** 
Senior 0.6857 0.6948 -0.0091 
Amount Issued 3.86E+08 4.98E+08 -1.12E+08*** 
Subsector 1.00E+09 1.00E+09 -5.49E+03 
Listed 0.3757 0.4172 -.0415*** 
 
Panel C: This panel provides the summary statistics for the amount issued between Rule 144A and registered bonds.  
The amount issued is in dollars. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
144A Amount Issued ($) 3.86e+08 2.50e+08 4.33e+08 40000 6.15e+09 




Table 15: OLS and Fixed Effects Liquidity Premium Analysis 
This table provides the regression results with liquidity premium as the dependent variable.  The following 
regressions were performed: Column 1: Rule 144A OLS regression with liquidity premium as the dependent 
variable; Column 2: Rule 144A firm FE regression with liquidity premium as the dependent variable; Column 3: 
Rule 144A OLS regression with liquidity premium as the dependent variable for firms that issued only one bond 
during the sample period. All three analyses controlled for industry and S&P rating category fixed effects.  Liquidity 
premium is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A and matched registered bond; Time  to Maturity 
is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon rate is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount 
issued in U.S. dollars; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the bond has subordinate 
payment rank; Equity Listed is equal to 1 if the firm has stock publicly trading on a U.S. exchange; Treasury Proxy 
is the Treasury proxy for two period off the run and on the run differences; and U.S. Indicator is 1 if the firm is 
headquartered in the United States.   The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011.  
  OLS FE OLS 
VARIABLES Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium 
Time to Maturity -0.000423*** -0.000274*** -0.000355** 
 (7.21e-05) (0.000103) (0.000180) 
Coupon rate 0.420*** 0.366*** 0.560*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0656) (0.0610) 
Amount Issued -2.05e-11*** -2.36e-11*** -2.07e-11*** 
 (2.02e-12) (3.07e-12) (4.40e-12) 
Senior Payment Rank 0.0244*** 0.0270*** 0.0288*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00261) (0.00291) 
Subordinate Payment Rank -0.00322** -0.00113 -0.00283 
 (0.00160) (0.00302) (0.00253) 
U.S. Indicator 0.000378  0.000530 
 (0.00124)  (0.00205) 
Equity Listed  0.0115*** 0.0188*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.000904) (0.00434) (0.00173) 
Treasury Proxy -0.000578 0.00453 0.0112 
 (0.0128) (0.0214) (0.0259) 
y03 -0.0208*** -0.0122** -0.0216*** 
 (0.00408) (0.00534) (0.00445) 
y04 -0.0250*** -0.0150*** -0.0280*** 
 (0.00407) (0.00488) (0.00440) 
y05 -0.0217*** -0.0140*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.00390) (0.00470) (0.00467) 
y06 -0.0242*** -0.0169*** -0.0224*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00464) (0.00449) 
y07 -0.0187*** -0.00903* -0.0223*** 
 (0.00386) (0.00478) (0.00434) 
y09 -0.00435 0.00533 -0.00815* 
 (0.00397) (0.00635) (0.00478) 
y10 -0.00588 0.00324 -0.00769* 
 (0.00402) (0.00568) (0.00414) 
y11 -0.00358 0.000538 -0.00141 
 (0.00406) (0.00545) (0.00414) 
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Table 15: OLS and Fixed Effects Liquidity Premium Analysis (cont.) 
  OLS FE OLS 
VARIABLES Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium 
Constant -0.0150** -0.0245*** -0.0376*** 
 (0.00690) (0.00645) (0.0108) 






Observations 6,455 6,455 1,744 
R-squared 0.363  0.407 
Within R-sq  0.156  
Between R-sq  0.369  
Overall R-sq  0.342  
# of Firms  2,977  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 16: OLS and Fixed Effects Yield Spread Analysis 
This table provides the regression results with the yield spread as the dependent variable.  The following regressions 
were performed: Column 1:Rule 144A yield spread OLS regression; Column 2: Registered bond yield spread OLS 
regression; Column 3: Rule 144A yield spread firm FE regression; Column 4: Registered bond yield spread firm FE 
regression.   The OLS regressions control for industry and S&P rating category fixed effects.  Firm FE regressions 
controls for S&P rating category fixed effects.  Spread is the yield spread between the 144A bond yield to maturity 
and the interpolated Treasury yield; Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the 
bond; Amt Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Callable is an indicator for callable bonds; Senior is 1 if 
the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the bond has subordinate payment rank; Equity is 1 if the firm 
has stock publicly traded on a U.S. exchange; and, U.S. is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States.  The 
sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011.  
  OLS 144A OLS Reg FE 144A FE Reg 
VARIABLES Spread Spread Spread Spread 
          
Maturity -0.000781*** -0.000635*** -0.000550*** -0.000489*** 
 (3.81e-05) (1.07e-05) (5.79e-05) (7.82e-05) 
Coupon 0.900*** 0.924*** 0.817*** 0.834*** 
 (0.0187) (0.00805) (0.0554) (0.0690) 
Amt Issued 6.51e-13 8.60e-13*** -2.09e-12* 6.68e-13** 
 (6.09e-13) (1.38e-13) (1.26e-12) (2.98e-13) 
Callable -0.00193*** 0.000679*** -0.00283*** -0.00127** 
 (0.000439) (0.000152) (0.000995) (0.000534) 
US 0.00136** 0.000789*   
 (0.000656) (0.000460)   
Senior -0.000968 0.00188*** -0.000121 0.000234 
 (0.000654) (0.000255) (0.00129) (0.00137) 
Subordinate -0.00245*** 0.00180*** 0.000187 0.00215 
 (0.000437) (0.000232) (0.00116) (0.00213) 
Equity -0.00155*** -0.00171*** 0.00252** 0.000265 
 (0.000437) (0.000163) (0.00127) (0.000845) 
y03 -0.0120*** -0.00342*** -0.00847* -0.00603*** 
 (0.00328) (0.000236) (0.00505) (0.00131) 
y04 -0.0152*** -0.00721*** -0.0127*** -0.00930*** 
 (0.00337) (0.000219) (0.00488) (0.00129) 
y05 -0.0183*** -0.00960*** -0.0171*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.00324) (0.000216) (0.00514) (0.00149) 
y06 -0.0253*** -0.0148*** -0.0232*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.00311) (0.000249) (0.00540) (0.00176) 
y07 -0.0242*** -0.0129*** -0.0205*** -0.0129*** 
 (0.00322) (0.000251) (0.00547) (0.00176) 
y09 -0.00104 0.00721*** 0.00149 0.00700*** 
 (0.00320) (0.000316) (0.00753) (0.00102) 
y10 -0.00218 0.00794*** -0.00231 0.00437*** 
 (0.00331) (0.000315) (0.00574) (0.00151) 
y11 -0.00228 0.0109*** -0.00316 0.00643*** 
 (0.00330) (0.000323) (0.00517) (0.00162) 
Constant -0.00942** -0.0241*** -0.00322 -0.0162*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00210) (0.00627) (0.00375) 




S&P Rating S&P Rating 




Table 16: OLS and Fixed Effects Yield Spread Analysis (cont.) 
  OLS 144A OLS Reg FE 144A FE Reg 
VARIABLES Spread Spread Spread Spread 
     
Observations 6,465 15,289 6,465 15,289 
R-squared 0.756 0.897   
Within R-sq   0.502 0.766 
Between R-sq   0.822 0.939 
Overall R-sq   0.736 0.881 
# of firms     2,978 1,200 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 17: Probit Analysis 
This table provides the probit analysis determining the probability of a bond being issued with registration rights 
agreements.  Column 1 uses year indicators in the analysis; Column 2 uses an amendment indicator equal to 1 if the 
bond was issued after the Rule 144 Feb. 15, 2008 amendment.  The probit analysis controls for  industry and S&P 
rating category fixed effects.  Firm FE regressions also controls for the following fixed effects: S&P rating and S&P 
ratings interacted with the amendment indicator.  Reg rights is 1 if the bond has a registration rights agreement; 
Time  to Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon rate is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is 
the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Senior payment rank is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; U.S. Indicator 
is 1 if the firm is headquartered in the United States; and Amendment is 0 for before February 15, 2008 and 1 after ; 
Equity is 1 if the firm has stock publicly traded on a U.S. exchange; Subordinate payment rank is 1 if the bond has 
subordinate payment rank; and Callable is an indicator equal to 1 for callable bonds.   The sample period is from 
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011.  
 VARIABLES Probit(reg. rights) Probit(reg. rights) 
      
Time to Maturity -0.00282 -0.000843 
 (-0.00085) (-0.00026) 
Coupon rate 1.840 0.743 
 (0.55547) (0.22723) 
Amount Issued 5.46e-10*** 5.25e-10*** 
 (1.65e-10) (1.61e-10) 
Senior payment rank 0.266*** 0.249*** 
 (0.07685) (0.07319) 
U.S. Indicator 0.754*** 0.709*** 
 (0.19749) (0.19041) 
Equity Listed 0.746*** 0.713*** 
 (0.23606) (0.22790) 
Subordinate payment rank 0.348*** 0.283*** 
 (0.11508) (0.09318) 
Callable 0.879*** 0.866*** 
 (0.22788) (0.22844) 
y03 -0.468***  
 (-0.12278)  
y04 0.405***  
 (0.13438)  
y05 0.376***  
 (0.12495)  
y06 0.163  
 (0.05141)  
y07 0.0646  
 (0.01987)  
y09 -0.0862  
 ('-0.02533)  
y10 -0.0598  
 (-0.01774)  
y11 0.0207  
 (0.00629)  
Amend  -0.0996** 
  (-0.03019) 
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Table 17: Probit Analysis (cont.) 
 VARIABLES Probit(reg. rights) Probit(reg. rights) 
   
Constant -2.330*** -2.125*** 




Observations 6,303 6,303 
psuedo R-sq 0.440 0.421 
Marginal effects in parentheses   




Table 18: Sensitivity Analysis Before and After Amendment 
This table provides the FE regression results with the liquidity premium as the dependent variable.  Column 1:Rule 
144A liquidity premium as the explanatory variable for bonds issued before Feb. 15, 2008; Column 2: Rule 144A 
liquidity premium as the explanatory variable for bonds issued on or after Feb. 15, 2009.  The regressions control for 
S&P rating category fixed effects.  Liquidity Premium is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A and 
matched registered bond; Yrs to Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; 
Amt Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 
1 if the bond has subordinate payment rank; Equity Listed is 1 if the firm has equity trading on a U.S. exchange; 
Treasury Proxy is the Treasury proxy for two period off the run and on the run differences; and, U.S. is 1 if the firm 
is headquartered in the United States.  The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011.  
  FE Pre-Amend FE Post-Amend 
VARIABLES Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium 
      
Time to Maturity -0.000312** -0.000274* 
 (0.000132) (0.000158) 
Coupon 0.285*** 0.514*** 
 (0.0643) (0.147) 
Amt Issued -2.22e-11*** -2.48e-11*** 
 (4.48e-12) (4.57e-12) 
Senior 0.0257*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00580) 
Subordinate 6.21e-05 0.00261 
 (0.00460) (0.00805) 
Equity Listed 0.0237*** 0.0230*** 
 (0.00829) (0.00817) 
Treasury Proxy -0.0181 0.0686 
 (0.0160) (0.0535) 
Constant -0.0349*** -0.0444*** 
 (0.00587) (0.00944) 
Fixed Effects S&P Rating S&P Rating 
   
Observations 4,037 2,418 
Within R-sq 0.103 0.265 
Between R-sq 0.2711 0.285 
Overall R-sq 0.2874 0.248 
Number of Firms 1,942 1,460 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 19: Sensitivity Analysis: U.S. Firms and Publicly Traded Firms 
This table provides the FE regression results with the liquidity premium as the dependent variable.  Column 1: Rule 
144A liquidity premium as the dependent variable for bonds issued by non-U.S. firms; and, Column 2: Rule 144A 
liquidity premium as the dependent variable for bonds issued by U.S. firms.   Column 3:Rule 144A liquidity 
premium as the dependent variable for bonds without equity listed on a U.S. exchange; Column 4: Rule 144A 
liquidity premium as the dependent variable for bonds listed on a U.S. exchange; Firm FE regressions also controls 
for the following fixed effects: S&P rating and S&P ratings interacted with the amendment indicator. Liquidity 
Premium is the difference in yield spreads between the Rule 144A and matched registered bond; Time to Maturity is 
the time to maturity at issuance; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amt Issued is the total amount issued in 
U.S. dollars; Senior is 1 if the bond has senior payment rank; Subordinate is 1 if the bond has subordinate payment 
rank; Treasury Proxy is the Treasury proxy for two period off the run and on the run differences; and, Listed  is 1 if 
the firm has stock trading on a U.S. exchange.  The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011.  
  Non-U.S. Firms U.S. Firms Not -Listed Listed 
VARIABLES Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium Liquidity Premium 
Time to Mty -0.000343 -0.000208* -0.000289* -9.28e-05 
 (0.000221) (0.000113) (0.000148) (0.000138) 
Coupon 0.320*** 0.397*** 0.318*** 0.399*** 
 (0.119) (0.0796) (0.0888) (0.0698) 
Amt Issued -2.09e-11*** -2.53e-11*** -2.39e-11*** -2.45e-11*** 
 (5.07e-12) (3.90e-12) (4.15e-12) (3.53e-12) 
Senior 0.0341*** 0.0231*** 0.0309*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00540) (0.00293) (0.00366) (0.00294) 
Subordinate -0.00109 -5.59e-05 0.000934 -0.00227 
 (0.00728) (0.00340) (0.00474) (0.00304) 
Treas Proxy  0.0308 -0.00233 0.0186 -0.00956 
 (0.0550) (0.0213) (0.0337) (0.0142) 
Listed 0.0163 0.0190***   
 (0.0107) (0.00480)   
y03 -0.00367 -0.0151** -0.0157* -0.00835** 
 (0.0104) (0.00597) (0.00840) (0.00357) 
y04 -0.00614 -0.0175*** -0.0196** -0.0112*** 
 (0.00835) (0.00543) (0.00766) (0.00351) 
y05 0.00154 -0.0182*** -0.0179** -0.00870** 
 (0.00692) (0.00558) (0.00731) (0.00342) 
y06 -0.00609 -0.0206*** -0.0186** -0.0142*** 
 (0.00681) (0.00560) (0.00723) (0.00332) 
y07 0.000556 -0.0128** -0.00941 -0.00901*** 
 (0.00675) (0.00585) (0.00732) (0.00341) 
y09 0.0154** 0.00144 0.00192 0.00884** 
 (0.00723) (0.00794) (0.00994) (0.00386) 
y10 0.0130 -0.000220 -0.00129 0.00625 
 (0.00806) (0.00674) (0.00884) (0.00397) 
y11 0.0109 -0.00368 -0.00390 0.00197 
 (0.00890) (0.00607) (0.00864) (0.00401) 
Constant -0.0338*** -0.0223*** -0.0143 -0.0161** 
 (0.0123) (0.00668) (0.00875) (0.00625) 
Fixed Effects S&P Rating S&P Rating S&P Rating S&P Rating 
     
Observations 1,770 4,685 4,032 2,423 
Within R-sq 0.190 0.152 0.139 0.246 
Between R-sq 0.383 0.342 0.2812 0.487 
Overall R-sq 0.329 0.344 0.2675 0.487 
Number of Firms 936 2,041 1,896 1,145 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating 
This table provides a summary variable means by S&P rating.  The table is separated into seven different panels: Panel A contains the means by S&P rating for 
the entire sample of Rule 144A and registered bonds; Panel B contains the means for Rule 144A bonds; Panel C contains the means for registered bonds; Panel D 
contains the means for Rule 144A bonds issued before the amendment; Panel E contains the means for Rule 144A bonds issued after the amendment; Panel F 
contains the means for registered bonds issued before the amendment; and, Panel G contains the means for registered bonds issued after the amendment.  Count 
is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield of the fixed coupon bond if held to maturity; Spread is the spread between the 144A bond yield to 
maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Amount issued is the 
dollar value of the bond issue; and Time to Maturity is the time to maturity at issuance.  The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011. 
 
Panel A: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for the entire sample 
of Rule 144A and registered bonds.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread 
between the 144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in 
U.S. dollars; Time to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 1710 0.0445 0.0056 0.0446 2.25e+08 8.6018 
AA+ 509 0.0461 0.0063 0.0460 1.09e+08 10.0546 
AA 1307 0.0465 0.0073 0.0465 1.71e+08 10.0227 
AA- 1771 0.0465 0.0896 0.0465 1.42e+08 7.9402 
A+ 1522 0.0469 0.0115 0.0463 2.99e+08 10.2886 
A 4854 0.0490 0.0099 0.0489 1.31e+08 11.0670 
A- 1176 0.0515 0.0150 0.0513 3.61e+08 11.7597 
BBB+ 1064 0.0523 0.0180 0.0520 3.95e+08 10.5523 
BBB 1266 0.0542 0.0182 0.0539 3.38e+08 10.3036 
BBB- 835 0.0598 0.0255 0.0587 4.16e+08 10.6037 
BB+ 290 0.0696 0.0350 0.0688 5.01e+08 9.0579 
BB 309 0.0784 0.0434 0.0774 4.79e+08 8.8400 
BB- 463 0.0806 0.0457 0.0793 4.38e+08 8.4656 
B+ 557 0.0889 0.0548 0.0876 4.23e+08 8.0421 
B 642 0.0939 0.0599 0.0926 3.90e+08 7.7032 
B- 698 0.0984 0.0618 0.0960 3.56e+08 7.9306 
CCC+ 262 0.1036 0.0664 0.0998 3.40e+08 7.9067 
CCC 97 0.1047 0.0685 0.1028 4.24e+08 7.4422 
CCC- 16 0.1089 0.0712 0.1056 4.97e+08 7.1632 
CC 6 0.0871 0.0620 0.0871 2.21e+08 8.7264 
C 2 0.1206 0.1006 0.1206 9.18e+07 4.2834 
D 162 0.0529 0.0043 0.0529 9.33e+07 1.5704 




Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel B: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for the full sample of 
Rule 144A bonds.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between the 144A 
bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Time 
to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue.  
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 665 0.0414 0.0047 0.0415 2.39E+08 3.4837 
AA+ 13 0.0382 0.0102 0.0379 4.10E+08 5.7569 
AA 180 0.0461 0.0107 0.0458 4.53E+08 9.8194 
AA- 79 0.0511 0.0157 0.0507 6.82E+08 9.0339 
A+ 146 0.0500 0.0194 0.0449 7.23E+08 9.9165 
A 192 0.0549 0.0188 0.0545 5.82E+08 12.9012 
A- 222 0.0539 0.0183 0.0534 5.92E+08 11.9613 
BBB+ 287 0.0567 0.0199 0.0560 5.95E+08 12.9748 
BBB 344 0.0593 0.0219 0.0588 4.67E+08 11.8040 
BBB- 331 0.0624 0.0261 0.0602 4.83E+08 11.2737 
BB+ 187 0.0716 0.0360 0.0707 5.60E+08 9.3504 
BB 237 0.0796 0.0443 0.0786 4.64E+08 8.5741 
BB- 369 0.0811 0.0452 0.0800 4.50E+08 8.5318 
B+ 455 0.0890 0.0546 0.0879 4.05E+08 8.0369 
B 554 0.0942 0.0599 0.0929 3.81E+08 7.6963 
B- 622 0.0988 0.0618 0.0964 3.41E+08 7.9661 
CCC+ 241 0.1040 0.0662 0.1003 3.28E+08 7.9506 
CCC 90 0.1048 0.0682 0.1029 4.13E+08 7.4259 
CCC- 13 0.1050 0.0648 0.1026 5.69E+08 7.4929 
CC 6 0.0871 0.0620 0.0871 2.21E+08 8.7264 
C 2 0.1206 0.1006 0.1206 9.18E+07 4.2834 
D 162 0.0529 0.0043 0.0529 9.33E+07 1.5704 





Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel C: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for the full sample of 
registered bonds.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between the 144A bond 
yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; Time to 
Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 1045 0.0466 0.0063 0.0465 2.17E+08 11.8588 
AA+ 496 0.0463 0.0062 0.0462 1.01E+08 10.1672 
AA 1127 0.0466 0.0067 0.0466 1.26E+08 10.0552 
AA- 1692 0.0463 0.0086 0.0462 1.16E+08 7.8891 
A+ 1376 0.0466 0.0106 0.0465 2.54E+08 10.3281 
A 4662 0.0487 0.0095 0.0487 1.12E+08 10.9914 
A- 954 0.0510 0.0142 0.0508 3.07E+08 11.7127 
BBB+ 777 0.0507 0.0174 0.0505 3.21E+08 9.6575 
BBB 922 0.0523 0.0169 0.0520 2.89E+08 9.7438 
BBB- 504 0.0581 0.0251 0.0576 3.73E+08 10.1637 
BB+ 103 0.0659 0.0331 0.0654 3.92E+08 8.5268 
BB 72 0.0742 0.0402 0.0735 5.27E+08 9.7132 
BB- 94 0.0788 0.0477 0.0766 3.92E+08 8.2059 
B+ 102 0.0885 0.0556 0.0859 5.07E+08 8.0652 
B 88 0.0919 0.0598 0.0905 4.47E+08 7.7462 
B- 76 0.0955 0.0621 0.0928 4.82E+08 7.6396 
CCC+ 21 0.0994 0.0687 0.0936 4.88E+08 7.4030 
CCC 7 0.1043 0.0731 0.1023 5.54E+08 7.6511 
CCC- 3 0.1254 0.0991 0.1188 1.85E+08 5.7349 
CC 0      
C 0      
D 0      





Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel D: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for Rule 144A bonds 
issued before the amendment.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between 
the 144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. 
dollars; Time to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 602 0.0420 0.0037 0.0422 1.48E+08 3.0685 
AA+ 8 0.0474 0.0103 0.0471 4.54E+08 6.5962 
AA 117 0.0489 0.0082 0.0486 2.13E+08 10.0785 
AA- 43 0.0563 0.0135 0.0562 4.26E+08 8.4311 
A+ 65 0.0513 0.0105 0.0510 5.61E+08 10.8985 
A 101 0.0575 0.0141 0.0575 3.77E+08 14.0347 
A- 109 0.0543 0.0121 0.0537 4.88E+08 12.7549 
BBB+ 157 0.0574 0.0134 0.0564 4.56E+08 14.3477 
BBB 216 0.0591 0.0169 0.0586 3.78E+08 12.4768 
BBB- 195 0.0610 0.0192 0.0607 3.84E+08 12.0657 
BB+ 101 0.0688 0.0264 0.0687 4.56E+08 10.0946 
BB 115 0.0757 0.0329 0.0754 3.48E+08 9.3607 
BB- 194 0.0761 0.0336 0.0759 3.89E+08 9.1990 
B+ 238 0.0848 0.0438 0.0847 3.38E+08 8.6443 
B 305 0.0900 0.0486 0.0896 2.98E+08 8.3427 
B- 412 0.0967 0.0548 0.0951 3.06E+08 8.2632 
CCC+ 161 0.1062 0.0631 0.1017 2.71E+08 8.0913 
CCC 58 0.1026 0.0608 0.1022 3.79E+08 7.5284 
CCC- 11 0.1005 0.0575 0.0984 6.13E+08 7.8111 
CC 0      
C 0      
D 162 0.0529 0.0043 0.0529 9.33E+07 1.5704 





Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel E: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for Rule 144A bonds 
issued after the amendment.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between the 
144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; 
Time to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 63 0.0357 0.0135 0.0344 1.11E+09 7.4509 
AA+ 5 0.0236 0.0099 0.0232 3.40E+08 4.4140 
AA 63 0.0408 0.0153 0.0405 8.97E+08 9.3381 
AA- 36 0.0449 0.0182 0.0442 9.88E+08 9.7539 
A+ 81 0.0489 0.0266 0.0400 8.52E+08 9.1284 
A 91 0.0521 0.0241 0.0512 8.10E+08 11.6432 
A- 113 0.0536 0.0242 0.0530 6.93E+08 11.1957 
BBB+ 130 0.0559 0.0276 0.0555 7.63E+08 11.3169 
BBB 128 0.0596 0.0301 0.0591 6.16E+08 10.6686 
BBB- 136 0.0644 0.0358 0.0596 6.24E+08 10.1382 
BB+ 86 0.0748 0.0473 0.0731 6.83E+08 8.4765 
BB 122 0.0833 0.0551 0.0816 5.74E+08 7.8326 
BB- 175 0.0866 0.0581 0.0845 5.18E+08 7.7921 
B+ 217 0.0935 0.0665 0.0914 4.78E+08 7.3708 
B 249 0.0994 0.0738 0.0969 4.81E+08 6.9046 
B- 210 0.1027 0.0754 0.0990 4.09E+08 7.3833 
CCC+ 80 0.0996 0.0724 0.0974 4.41E+08 7.6672 
CCC 32 0.1088 0.0815 0.1041 4.76E+08 7.2401 
CCC- 2 0.1300 0.1052 0.1256 3.25E+08 5.7426 
CC 6 0.0871 0.0620 0.0871 2.21E+08 8.7264 
C 2 0.1206 0.1006 0.1206 9.18E+07 4.2834 
D 0      




Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel F: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for registered bonds 
issued before the amendment.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between 
the 144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. 
dollars; Time to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 929 0.0473 0.0050 0.0473 8.23E+07 12.4604 
AA+ 379 0.0468 0.0037 0.0468 5.30E+07 9.9439 
AA 991 0.0471 0.0055 0.0470 6.25E+07 10.3422 
AA- 1190 0.0485 0.0065 0.0484 7.85E+07 6.9983 
A+ 980 0.0463 0.0075 0.0462 2.12E+08 10.1726 
A 3628 0.0499 0.0069 0.0498 5.73E+07 11.4652 
A- 644 0.0513 0.0099 0.0512 1.95E+08 12.1162 
BBB+ 516 0.0496 0.0135 0.0495 2.07E+08 8.7525 
BBB 593 0.0511 0.0113 0.0509 2.17E+08 9.1568 
BBB- 192 0.0600 0.0174 0.0598 3.98E+08 11.9606 
BB+ 51 0.0666 0.0253 0.0664 4.29E+08 9.3507 
BB 21 0.0688 0.0273 0.0700 2.89E+08 9.1276 
BB- 20 0.0726 0.0290 0.0723 3.25E+08 9.3262 
B+ 31 0.0772 0.0347 0.0774 7.17E+08 8.8622 
B 30 0.0813 0.0375 0.0813 4.08E+08 8.9553 
B- 29 0.0873 0.0427 0.0871 4.79E+08 8.3571 
CCC+ 5 0.0915 0.0483 0.0908 1.54E+08 10.4241 
CCC 1 0.0925 0.0613 0.0925 6.25E+08 7.1348 
CCC- 0      
CC 0      
C 0      
D 0      





Table 20: Variable Means by Credit Rating (cont.) 
Panel G: This panel contains the means for yield to maturity, yield spread, coupon rate, amount issued and time to maturity by S&P rating for registered bonds 
issued after the amendment.  Count is the number of bonds in that credit rating; YTM is the yield to maturity of the bond; Spread is the yield spread between the 
144A bond yield to maturity and the interpolated Treasury yield; Coupon is the coupon rate of the bond; Amount Issued is the total amount issued in U.S. dollars; 
Time to Maturity is the time to maturity of the bond at issue. 
S&P Rating Count YTM Spread Coupon Amount Issued Time to Maturity 
AAA 116 0.0405 0.0165 0.0403 1.29E+09 7.0411 
AA+ 117 0.0445 0.0145 0.0444 2.57E+08 10.8905 
AA 136 0.0434 0.0155 0.0431 5.90E+08 7.9637 
AA- 502 0.0412 0.0137 0.0411 2.07E+08 10.0008 
A+ 396 0.0472 0.0184 0.0471 3.59E+08 10.7131 
A 1034 0.0448 0.0190 0.0446 3.05E+08 9.3292 
A- 310 0.0503 0.0232 0.0500 5.40E+08 10.8746 
BBB+ 261 0.0530 0.0251 0.0525 5.46E+08 11.4466 
BBB 329 0.0544 0.0268 0.0539 4.20E+08 10.8018 
BBB- 312 0.0569 0.0298 0.0563 3.57E+08 9.0579 
BB+ 52 0.0652 0.0407 0.0643 3.56E+08 7.7187 
BB 51 0.0764 0.0455 0.0749 6.26E+08 9.9544 
BB- 74 0.0804 0.0527 0.0778 4.10E+08 7.9031 
B+ 71 0.0935 0.0648 0.0897 4.16E+08 7.7172 
B 58 0.0974 0.0713 0.0953 4.67E+08 7.1208 
B- 47 0.1006 0.0740 0.0963 4.83E+08 7.1968 
CCC+ 16 0.1019 0.0751 0.0945 5.92E+08 6.4589 
CCC 6 0.1062 0.0750 0.1040 5.43E+08 7.7372 
CCC- 3 0.1254 0.0991 0.1188 1.85e+08 5.7349 
CC 0      
C 0      
D 0      







Table 21: Average Number of Issues by Industry 
This table provides the average Rule 144A bonds issued per firm based on the firm industry.  The total sample 
includes 6,465 bonds issued between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2011.  There are a total of 2,978 firms 





Basic Materials 2.62 
Communications 3.40 
Consumer, Cyclic 2.99 











Table 22: Liquidity Premium by Total Number of Issues 
This table provides data statistics based on the number of bonds issued in the Rule 144A market by firm.  The first 
column provides the number of bonds issued and the second column provides the number of firms that issued that 
corresponding number of bonds in the sample.  Column 3 provides the average liquidity premium for the number of 
bonds issued by firms as specified in Column 1.  Column 4 provides the corresponding standard deviation and 
Columns 5 and 6 list the minimum and maximum liquidity premiums specific to each issue group.  The sample 














1 1745 .0088684 .040983 -.2212827 .139073 
2 624 .0079655 .0374325 -.168603 .2244333 
3 255 .0029512 .0356427 -.1919296 .1061558 
4 141 .0037187 .0474868 -.1744356 .359329 
5 71 .0002716 .0390824 -.1110737 .1026106 
6 41 -.0020326 .0333108 -.1208375 .0770631 
7 32 -.006219 .0381951 -.1867441 .0958711 
8 14 -.0061895 .0436767 -.1355376 .1037777 
9 14 -.0070125 .0397091 -.1737404 .0641871 
10 5 -.0007238 .0201296 -.0467546 .0341026 
11 1 -.0168891 .0285232 -.0710016 .0162384 
12 4 -.0162248 .0375169 -.1153441 .040494 
13 5 -.0161896 .0319641 -.1108819 .0388476 
14 1 -.0265315 .0325003 -.0960102 .006178 
15 4 -.0246323 .0362981 -.102255 .0566396 
16 3 -.0120912 .0849129 -.1355539 .3599621 
17 3 -.0173794 .0448744 -.1894281 .0465355 
19 2 -.0035816 .0616421 -.0950382 .2044252 
21 1 -.0165166 .0371108 -.1108076 .0223888 
24 2 -.0251086 .0262104 -.0942883 .0021104 
26 1 .0004562 .0069316 -.0157529 .0111783 
28 1 -.0260231 .0282563 -.0918767 -.0030462 
34 1 -.0423171 .0430591 -.1006981 .0020268 
37 1 -.0186367 .0197994 -.0645756 .027789 
57 1 -.0180651 .0217673 -.0775434 .0017862 
62 1 -.02138 .0233637 -.0779385 .0164104 
63 1 -.044536 .0427848 -.1132305 .0013899 
67 1 -.024907 .0250966 -.1082169 .0132108 
93 1 -.0454681 .0427313 -.1487894 .0059393 
163 1 -.025161 .0249425 -.1130735 .0237691 
      





Table 23: Regression Analysis for Multiple Issuers 
This table provides regression results varying the bonds based on the number of bonds a firm has issued in my 
sample period.  The first column provides results of a firm fixed effects regression on the full sample of 6,465 
bonds.  The second column provides results of an OLS regression on bonds from firms that issued only one bond 
over the sample period.  Column 3 provides the firm fixed effect results of bonds from firms that issued 1, 2, 3, 4, or 
5 bonds over the sample period.  The last column provides the firm fixed effects results of bonds from firms that 
issued more than five bonds over the sample period.  The sample period is from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 
2011. 
 FE OLS FE FE 
  Full Sample No Issues = 1 No Issues<6 No Issues >5 
VARIABLES Liqprem liqprem liqprem Liqprem 
Time to Maturity -0.000274*** -0.000355** -0.000350*** -0.000194 
 (0.000103) (0.000180) (0.000129) (0.000166) 
Coupon 0.366*** 0.560*** 0.336*** 0.375*** 
 (0.0656) (0.0610) (0.0839) (0.0988) 
Amt Issued -2.36e-11*** -2.07e-11*** -2.06e-11*** -2.62e-11*** 
 (3.07e-12) (4.40e-12) (4.90e-12) (3.70e-12) 
Senior 0.0270*** 0.0288*** 0.0264*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.00261) (0.00291) (0.00383) (0.00336) 
Subordinate -0.00113 -0.00283 -0.000612 0.00152 
 (0.00302) (0.00253) (0.00364) (0.00573) 
Equity 0.0188*** 0.0159*** 0.0175*** 0.0182** 
 (0.00434) (0.00173) (0.00551) (0.00810) 
Treas Proxy 0.00453 0.0112 -0.0356* 0.0244 
 (0.0214) (0.0259) (0.0214) (0.0300) 
U.S.  0.000530   
  (0.00205)   
y03 -0.0122** -0.0216*** -0.00342 -0.0226** 
 (0.00534) (0.00445) (0.00481) (0.00909) 
y04 -0.0150*** -0.0280*** -0.00860** -0.0243*** 
 (0.00488) (0.00440) (0.00434) (0.00885) 
y05 -0.0140*** -0.0255*** -0.00783* -0.0243*** 
 (0.00470) (0.00467) (0.00450) (0.00872) 
y06 -0.0169*** -0.0224*** -0.0120*** -0.0268*** 
 (0.00464) (0.00449) (0.00416) (0.00879) 
y07 -0.00903* -0.0223*** -0.00263 -0.0196** 
 (0.00478) (0.00434) (0.00435) (0.00898) 
y09 0.00533 -0.00815* 0.0180*** -0.0130 
 (0.00635) (0.00478) (0.00425) (0.0113) 
y10 0.00324 -0.00769* 0.0131*** -0.0110 
 (0.00568) (0.00414) (0.00421) (0.0106) 
y11 0.000538 -0.00141 0.00992** -0.0143 
 (0.00545) (0.00414) (0.00440) (0.0104) 
Constant -0.0251*** -0.0351*** -0.0330*** -0.00850 
 (0.00610) (0.00791) (0.00816) (0.0112) 
Fixed Effects S&P Rating Industry 
S&P Rating 
S&P Rating S&P Rating 
Observations 6,455 1,744 4,673 1,782 
R-squared  0.407   
Within R-sq 0.156  0.157 0.179 
Between R-sq 0.369  0.358 0.666 
Overall R-sq 0.342  0.301 0.313 
Number of firms  0.407   
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 24: Exchanged Bond Statistics 
The following table provides summary statistics on the 1,341 bonds that were exchanged for registered debt that have all information necessary to calculate yield 
spreads.  Exchanged bond identifiers and exchange dates were obtained from Bloomberg.  Trade information was obtained from TRACE.  Days are calendar 
days. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All 
Years 
Total Number of Bonds 370 299 131 82 119 52 116 131 41  
          
Days between Rule 144A issue and 
exchange       
 
Mean 185.40 174.20 190.26 216.59 212.06 258.50 230.84 218.76 168.88 197.17 
Median 175 160 166 191.5 204 245.5 224.50 216  166 179 
Standard Deviation 95.51 91.17 114.10 105.98 131.53 111.53 101.12 86.25 54.61 102.49 
Min 47 42 50 58 49 49 46 71 68 42 
Max 825 858 815 526 1060 475 669 536 322 1060 
          
Days between 144A issue and first trade        
Mean 508.66 266.83 223.44 268.17 246.56 309.27 251.27 232.66 178.68 321.87 
Median 503.5 242 180 212 218 317.5 239 228 179 267 
Standard Deviation 180.99 191.80 179.68 219.92 188.74 153.93 126.15 93.35 52.83 208.26 
Min 90 77 63 62 51 58 49 71 76 49 
Max 1870 2284 1513 1582 1456 910 860 560 323 2284 
          
Days between exchange and first trade        
Mean 323.26 92.62 33.18 51.59 34.50 50.77 20.42 13.91 9.80 124.70 
Median 326.5 51 8 8.5 12 8 6 7 6 20 
Standard Deviation 196.18 186.64 139.86 205.29 142.15 151.29 81.79 28.23 12.99 204.55 
Min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

















Figure 1: Full Sample Rule 144A Bond Industry Sectors 





Figure 2: Full Sample Registered Bond Industry Sectors 









































Figure 3: Full Sample Rule 144A Bond Financial Subsector 





Figure 4: Full Sample Registered Bond Financial Subsector 





































Figure 5: Fixed Coupon Rule 144A Industry Sectors 
This figure provides the industry sectors of issuing firms in the Rule 144A market.  The data is only for fixed 




Figure 6: Fixed Coupon Registered Bond Industry Sectors 
This figure provides the industry sectors of issuing firms in the registered bond market.  The data is only for fixed 
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